Not to put words in your mouth, but it seems you've prefaced this discussion with the United States and Russia on an inevitable collision course similar to Germany and Europe in the 1930s.
You know I respect your opinion, but I don't see sufficient evidence to warrant this point of view.
Couple of points you've made here that I don't think are necessarily as grounded as others are:
1) Coupling aggression against NATO with aggression against non-NATO countries; these assuredly aren't the same. I don't think it's appropriate to bulk all of Europe into the definition of "ally."
2) I'm not sure who would be ruined by these consequences of expanded Russian aggression here?
Beginning with your last point, Russian government officials routinely threaten to annihilate the United States. It was not but a few months ago that a top Russian official was reported as threatening a nuclear confrontation with the U.S.
But again, to go back to an earlier point, I would prefer if we could identify the case for arming the Ukrainians specifically to issues dealing with that distinct nation and not NATO members.
Believe me I understand the complexity of your argument in saying that we should draw them out in Ukraine; however, as Ben Shapiro at the Brookings Institute stated that arming the Ukrainians and becoming directly involved in the conflict only strengthens Putin's hand, not the reverse.
Again, I'm aware of the situation in the Balkins, however, I do not see the looming Russian threat to NATO as you do - even with respect to the Lithuanians defense measures. So perhaps we can narrow the focus, at least initially, to the nations Russia is directly threatening with military force? Or is the entirety of the argument predicated on defending NATO itself?
Again, this draws back to the first point I made regarding this seemingly inevitable confrontation.
It seems to me, and correct me if I'm wrong, that you feel we either fight (by proxy) the Russians here in Ukraine, or perhaps elsewhere in the future in a larger-scale conflict? IS that right?
You're not the only one questioning whether or not NATO would invoke Article 5; however, I have to assume that the United States would defend its own.
But honestly, I think this is a separate and distinct issue.
But there is a great deal of conjecture here that seem to take liberty with what the United States might fail to do (under treaty obligation no less); and again, we're talking about actions against NATO.
I'm not in the same mind-frame in that I cannot accept the argument that we should arm the Ukrainians to prevent an attack against NATO. Because the counter-argument is that by arming the Ukrainians you may give justification to a war you're trying to prevent.
I don't think this is the consensus view.
Washington Post:
Neither the authors of the report (Brookings Institute) nor any other serious advocates of arming Kiev believe that better arming Kiev will actually enable Ukraine's government to defeat the Russian-backed forces. As Jeremy Shapiro, a Brookings scholar who recently wrote what serves as a dissent to his boss's report, points out, the calculus is both cynical and perhaps naive, given Moscow's willingness to provoke bloodshed in the region.
"It is hard to find comfort in a plan whose success relies on Vladimir Putin's sensitivity to death," Shapiro writes, noting the surging anti-American sentiment in Russia. Direct U.S. military aid to Ukraine would only deepen the anti-West, "anti-imperialist" narratives that have dominated airwaves in Russia over the past year and would reinforce the Kremlin's own messaging about the conflict as an existential struggle for Moscow's future.
And arming the Ukrainians, in your view, would accomplish this? He would retreat, defeated and humiliated by Kiev and that would be the end of it?
I'm just trying to get a picture of how you envision this all playing out.
It's interesting that you've concluded that arming the Ukrainians would somehow stop the Russians.
I don't come to the same end result.
Not to put words in your mouth, but it seems you've prefaced this discussion with the United States and Russia on an inevitable collision course similar to Germany and Europe in the 1930s. You know I respect your opinion, but I don't see sufficient evidence to warrant this point of view.
Couple of points you've made here that I don't think are necessarily as grounded as others are:
1) Coupling aggression against NATO with aggression against non-NATO countries; these assuredly aren't the same. I don't think it's appropriate to bulk all of Europe into the definition of "ally."
2) I'm not sure who would be ruined by these consequences of expanded Russian aggression here?
This is long so I will highlight key points.
I don't see confrontation (I don't mean military conflict, rather merely a lower-grade of Cold War hostility) between Russia and the US inevitable.
We have already arrived at the new Cold War; problem is that we aren't aware of that fact though Russia certainly is. Since Obama has been President, Putin has opposed US interests from Syria, to Iran to the Balkans.
It was inevitable as soon as Putin resolved to restore Russia's former position as a power insofar that creating a new order necessitates the destruction or partial deconstruction of the existing state of affairs.
1) I have to disagree with you as I think it is important to discuss NATO as the same breath as non-NATO nations that Russia claims hegemony over because there are former Soviet nations that are NATO members. Putin wishes to restore Soviet borders and that includes the Baltics. Also, I did make the distinction between the Ukraine and the Baltics as the costs of Russian aggression against NATO are notionally prohibitive.
I will say that I see the war in the Ukraine as the first (second if you count Georgia) step of a possible progression of aggression toward all former Soviet nations, including the Baltics. Maybe
@Sumac13 can shed some light on Putin's drive to restore Soviet and Imperial borders.
2) Ukraine has been devastated and its economy destroyed. However, Ukraine is not an important economic nation. If the war expanded to the Baltics, or Russia merely punished the Baltics through non-military means via embargoes etc.,
the impact would be widely felt in the EU, which at present has demonstrated that it is in a fragile economic state.
Beginning with your last point, Russian government officials routinely threaten to annihilate the United States. It was not but a few months ago that a top Russian official was reported as threatening a nuclear confrontation with the U.S.
But again, to go back to an earlier point, I would prefer if we could identify the case for arming the Ukrainians specifically to issues dealing with that distinct nation and not NATO members.
Believe me I understand the complexity of your argument in saying that we should draw them out in Ukraine; however, as Ben Shapiro at the Brookings Institute stated that arming the Ukrainians and becoming directly involved in the conflict only strengthens Putin's hand, not the reverse.
Again, I'm aware of the situation in the Balkins, however, I do not see the looming Russian threat to NATO as you do - even with respect to the Lithuanians defense measures. So perhaps we can narrow the focus, at least initially, to the nations Russia is directly threatening with military force? Or is the entirety of the argument predicated on defending NATO itself?
I'm not in the same mind-frame in that I cannot accept the argument that we should arm the Ukrainians to prevent an attack against NATO. Because the counter-argument is that by arming the Ukrainians you may give justification to a war you're trying to prevent.
I. Moscow runs its mouth all the time. However, with Russia, actions mean more than words. Russia's increased belligerence toward the Baltics is undeniable and the matter of the violation of Estonian sovereignty is outrageous.
The threat is real.
II. I disagree with Shapiro. His position is predicated on three flawed assumptions: 1) That the arms will escalate tensions between the US and Russia, possibly leading to military conflict, 2) That even with the weapons the Ukrainians "can't win," and 3) That increased costs in blood and treasure won't make Putin reconsider.
First, arming the Ukrainians does no create a proxy conflict. It allows the Ukrainians to defend themselves from an enemy that has superior numbers and weapons. There will be no cooperation between US and Ukrainian militaries. This will not be another Vietnam or Korea. It is more like Lend-Lease. Moreover, there is no further level of escalation the Russians can successful employ against the US. Tensions are already high, Russian propaganda has already whipped up anti-US hysteria.
Russia won't attack the US, they have no economic weapons and they can only attack NATO, which is a costly way of sticking to the Americans.
Second, Shapiro's reading of the tactical and strategic situation on the ground is dubious. No one expects the Ukrainians to drive the Russians and their puppets back to Russia. What we can expect them to do is prevent further Russian advances; all of which have occurred when regular Russian forces employed superior weapons to beat the Ukrainian Army down. The proposed weapons sale will allow the UA to fight on more even terms and inflict serious casualties on Russia and buy more time for the rebuilding of their forces.
The goal isn't to defeat the Russian Army; it is to bleed it long enough to bring Russia to the table and to negotiate in good faith. We know this can happen because Russia is near its limit with its military effort. The addition of new weapons will push the Russian ledger of cost/benefit analysis into the red.
Third, Shapiro's claim of Putin "not being swayed by grieving mothers" is simplistic and a disingenuous characterization of Russian domestic politics.
To begin to understand Putin, one must realize that his regime is a Russian version of Bonapartism insofar as his despotic rule is tolerated by the populace, and more importantly, the elites, so long as he wins victories and ensures economic prosperity. Everyone supports a war until the body bags come home and with the rearmed UA inflicting heavy losses, the war comes out in the open in Russia. Heavy losses undercut Putin's support on the basis of military victory and the ongoing sanctions, coupled with the strain on the economy from prolonged military effort, will continue to gut the economy.
Without military victories and faced with economic ruin, Putin will lose popular support, especially with the elites and threats to his rule will increase. As such, the cost in blood and treasure is very much something he takes into consideration of whether to continue to the fighting. Shapiro is simply wrong.
When the costs become too high, Putin will come to the table and it won't have anything to do with compassion.
And arming the Ukrainians, in your view, would accomplish this? He would retreat, defeated and humiliated by Kiev and that would be the end of it?
It's interesting that you've concluded that arming the Ukrainians would somehow stop the Russians.
It isn't my opinion, or a thought exercise;
it is a matter of military science.
I. Battle is not a hypothetical. For the most part battles or won or lost before a shot is fired. It is no surprise that the Ukrainians have lost a lot of ground recently.
Once the Russians decided to send sophisticated weapons to the rebels, and then decided to start sending in entire units of the Russian Army to straight-up fight the UA, the Ukrainians were boned. The balance of numbers on the ground was sufficient before Russian intervention because: 1) The number of combatants were acceptable for the UA (near parity), 2) The two sides were comparably equipped with the UA having a slight advantage in heavy weapons and 3) The rebels were poorly led and trained.
II. The Russian intervention completely destroyed that calculus. Now the Russians and rebels outnumber the UA, they outgun them by far and are fighting more effectively thanks to the leadership of highly-trained Russian regular units. Arming the Ukrainians will have the following positive effect:
a) The disparity in numbers is exacerbated by the UA being totally out-matched in weaponry. With US/NATO weaponry, the numbers matter less. The UA would no longer need numbers parity to hold their own: A 3-1 disadvantage in numbers is acceptable on the defense is they have the right weapons.
b) It gives the Ukrainians the upper-hand in a battle of attrition. Proper defensive weaponry, particularly anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, neutralize the advantage the Russians have on the attack. It makes advances into urban terrain a nightmare and allows the UA to economize and stabilize its front. Importantly, it makes every advance a costly affair which in turn degrades the effectiveness of Russian units and morale.
An anti-tank missile is much less costly than a tank and crew. If the UA can effectively start destroying Russian heavy-weapons it will dramatically increase the costs of the war for Russia.
c) Russian leadership will mean less when they are no longer able to employ the tactics they prefer with troops who are not afraid of the UA because of their lack of weapons. Not only will Russian doctrine of massed armor attacks, supported by indiscriminate artillery and air cover, be less effective, but far less effective in the face of effective defensive weaponry, but Russian troop morale will sag as casualties mount.
Whereas the Ukrainians are fighting for their homeland, Russian soldiers will be far less motivated fighting in a war they can't admit they are in, or could give two shits about.
So, yes, the Ukrainians can stop the Russians from further advances, they can and will inflict heavy losses and may even enjoy local successes. To counter the new weapons of the UA, the Russians will either have to straight-up send 20 divisions and start an all-out war (beyond their capabilities) or suffer from a being caught in a stalemate and forced to the table for the reasons enumerated above.
III. Putin has been playing with house money. He knows his position has been weak vis-à-vis the West and he knows better than anyone else that the only reason he has been successful is because no one has stood up to him. If the costs are high enough, and begin to threaten his personal rule, he will come to the table. Thanks to his propaganda machine, even a reverse in Ukraine can be explained away.
He won't look terrible if he can disengage from Ukraine and broker a peace that allows him to keep Crimea and a guarantee that Ukraine won't ever join the EU or NATO. 
