Should the US (and NATO) Arm Ukraine?

[The Human Q-Tip]

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Second, Shapiro's reading of the tactical and strategic situation on the ground is dubious. No one expects the Ukrainians to drive the Russians and their puppets back to Russia....

It isn't my opinion, or a thought exercise; it is a matter of military science.

I. Battle is not a hypothetical. For the most part battles or won or lost before a shot is fired. It is no surprise that the Ukrainians have lost a lot of ground recently....

This is a key point. Real battle is not a wargame where you move pieces who dutifully do what you tell them, whether it is suicidal attack or defense to the last man. The perception of whether or not you actually have a chance matters enormously, and if one side believes it is doomed, it is. Conversely, if the other side believes that victory is inevitable, it will fight that much harder.

The key is to start changing that calculus and those perceptions. Arm the Ukrainians, and they will fight that much harder, while Russian units will become more cautious and less eager to engage. They don't have to defeat the Russians. They just have to get to the point where Russian victory is going to be neither easy nor cheap.

 

[gourimoko]

This post is LONG.. Broken into 3 Parts... Sorry for the length, it's not intended for casual reading.

Part I

This is long so I will highlight key points.

I actually appreciate the detail you went into with this post.. It's not only well reasoned by actually quite informative, which is well, refreshing, considering the normal back and forths that can go on in some other threads..

With that said, I want to first say that I don't think we are necessarily on different sides of this issue in so much as I think you are ahead of me with respect to the timeline of events.

I don't think we are as far along in any potential new Cold War with the Russians as you do, for various reasons but primarily due to the comparative differences between today's relations with Russia and those that existed 30 years ago.

I'll be reducing your comments down just to give reference to what I'm referring to, however, I'm not deliberately trying to take you out of context; it's just for the sake of brevity.

I don't see confrontation (I don't mean military conflict, rather merely a lower-grade of Cold War hostility) between Russia and the US inevitable. We have already arrived at the new Cold War; problem is that we aren't aware of that fact though Russia certainly is.

Let's start here.

As I said a moment ago, I've not reached this conclusion yet - I think this is going quite a bit too far with respect to the reality of relations between American and Russia as well as the quite different relationship between Russia and Europe.

Surely American-Russian ties are strained at present, but Europeans and Russians have vital business interests relating to one another and neither party wants a further deterioration of relations, increased sanctions, or heightened tensions. This difference is critical in that it is in no way representative of the Cold War.

Continuing with Syria; the situation there is not of two competing, diametrically opposing philosophies as were capitalism and communism. Rather, two competing national interests, one of a superpower, and the other of a failed superpower, again, attempting to protect its few key business and military interests.

To that end, I think key points regarding Syrian-Russian relations, and Russian influence in the Middle East by and large, are often routinely ignored in favor of portraying Russian foreign policy as the madman ambitions of Vladimir Putin.

Specifically, Russia has over $30bn in invested capital interests in Syria, that chiefly depend on the perpetuation of Bashar al-Assad's regime. Those interests would likely end if a Western-oriented puppet, or an Islamic state were to gain control of Damascus. Furthermore, Russia has over $6bn in weapon sales committed to the Syrian regime, as their chief supplier of military armaments, and has been for decades.

Financially, Russia has substantial interests in Syria, comparatively speaking, there interests in Syria would be equivalent to $240bn in our own economy relatively to GDP. That is of enormous value to a nation so vulnerable to Western sanctions.

Militarily, Russias entirely Mediterranean presence is based out of their Syrian-Russian joint military facilities in Tartus. Those facilities are not new, they've existed since the early seventies; however and most importantly, they represent "Russia's only international military base outside of the former Soviet Union."

There is also the argument that Russian opposition in Syria is based on principle, however, which I think has some limited merit. That argument being that Russia has generally opposed US-led interventionism since the Cold War, and continues to do so.

The American military policy of regime change and nation-building has not only backfired but created a dangerous situation worldwide, particularly with respect to the proliferation of Islamic extremism and terrorism which not only threatens Western nations but to spill over into Russia due to it's continued and persistent issues with Chechnya.

Both in the present tense at the time, and in hindsight, the Russians, frankly, were right about Syria and al-Assad. American attempts to influence the region have largely destabilized not only Syria and Iraq, but created a tenuous and volatile situation spanning all of North Africa and the Middle East.

From the Russian perspective, right or wrong, this situation is chiefly due to American policies in the Middle East; and many would argue, this destabilization was somewhat intentional.

Moving on to Iran, I don't see the Russians as presently in opposition to our interests there; but instead in opposition to the interests of our regional ally.

However, I do think this situation could rapidly deteriorate based on what we choose to do with respect to Ukraine. In essence, it has been argued by numerous analysts that by arming the Ukrainians and starting a proxy war there, with the specific interest of destabilizing Russia, their natural and inevitable response would be to not only arm the Iranians but supply them with the means of continuing their nuclear arms program.

The Russians have already begun to position themselves to strengthen their military relations with Iran signing a Military Cooperation Agreement just two months ago in direct response to American. They've already signalled their desire to arm the Iranians, and the Iranians have already stated they will drop their international lawsuit against Russia in exchange for increased protection and cooperation.

Financially, the military armament deals between Iran and Russia have historically averaged between $5-8bn, and although no "sophisticated weapons can be sold under UN sanctions," a potential pact between Russia and Iran and a solution to the P5+1 negotiations could increase Iranian purchases of Russian armaments by over 100%. Furthermore, Russian nuclear deals in Iran, which have been stalled due to continued negotiations, are worth more than $12bn ($800m for only the first plant) to the Russian economy.

More specifically and with respect to nuclear deals, in May of last year, the Russians committed to building two, potentially breeder-style, nuclear reactors in Iran and have stated they will build an additional six in the next several years.
It is important to note that the fuel cycle for these reactors would be under the supervision and ownership of Iran, not Russia, and therefore Russia would be in essence giving Iran exactly what it needs to construct a nuclear arsenal of its own.

These two situations have largely gotten worse with time.

Syria and Iraq have given us the Islamic State, which has now spread across nearly all of North Africa. Any hope of diplomatically solving the situation in Syria seems to have long sinced passed. The hope of diplomatically resolving the situation in Iran is being sabotaged by the Israeli Prime Minister and conservatives in our own country.

Without a international cooperation from Russia, we have almost no hope whatsoever of resolving these issues. We cannot simply hope that they abstain from our attempts to influence political conditions in countries in which they have substantial and even vital interests, especially when our business and military interests in those countries could be considered almost non-existent.

1) I have to disagree with you as I think it is important to discuss NATO as the same breath as non-NATO nations that Russia claims hegemony over because there are former Soviet nations that are NATO members.

But, I take exception to this notion because our obligations to NATO states is completely different than that to non-NATO nations. I think that, by definition, this an unavoidable distinction that must be accounted for when determining an appropriate and measured response to Russia aggression in any given nation, especially with respect to those that are within Russia's sphere of influence.

The Ukraine does not meet the criteria of a nation that we are obligated to defend. Whereas, for example, Lithuania does. So the calculus of this is completely different. By conflating the two, simply because both are potentially threatened by Russia's intentions ignores this vital difference for reasons that can be described as being much more aggressive, I think, than defensive.

Putin wishes to restore Soviet borders and that includes the Baltics.

Indeed, but this is neither likely nor imminently on the horizon. I do not see a potential path to achieving such an end, particularly with respect to annexing the Baltic states.

Also, I did make the distinction between the Ukraine and the Baltics as the costs of Russian aggression against NATO are notionally prohibitive. I will say that I see the war in the Ukraine as the first (second if you count Georgia) step of a possible progression of aggression toward all former Soviet nations, including the Baltics. Maybe @Sumac13 can shed some light on Putin's drive to restore Soviet and Imperial borders.

I see Russian involvement in Ukraine as being far more complex than the ambitions of one single man. I think this point of view ignores the very serious issues of political corruption, the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians who protested and began the Euromaidan Revolution and ultimately led to Yanukovych’s impeachment. I think it's important to keep in mind there are so much larger issues at play than Putin including the continued decline of the nation going back to the turn of the century, the large Russian minority in Ukraine (nearly 1 in 5), and most perhaps importantly the state of future trade relations between Ukraine, Europe and Russia.

While Putin has been the chief driving force of the Ukrainian separatists, he did not fabricate or create the separatists out of thin air; although he is supporting them militarily and with Russian troops posing as Ukrainians.

These and the aforementioned reasons are why I've said it is not particularly useful to conflate the conflict in Ukraine, which is very specific to that country, with a potential and honestly as-of-yet imaginary conflict that could happen in a NATO nation.

2) Ukraine has been devastated and its economy destroyed. However, Ukraine is not an important economic nation.

I actually disagree with this, as I think economics is the driving force for both European and Russian involvement in Ukraine. Frankly, if Ukraine were not so economically vital to Russia, the Russians would not expend such effort to control the situation on the ground there.

Specifically, Ukraine is of vital interest to Russia's oil and gas exports, as well as to Europe's ability to buy cheap Russian fuel which it has no interest in not purchasing long-term; especially not for the sake of Ukrainian independence.

Below is an illustration of Russian Pipelines that are chiefly responsible for moving oil to Europe. This is again, of vital importance to the economies of both Russia and Europe; and again, this is why this situation should not be described as a Cold War, because Europe is not aligned against or opposed to Russian interests in the region if it were to mean an end to access to Russian oil.

Simply put, Ukraine is of huge economic and strategic importance to Russia.

If the war expanded to the Baltics, or Russia merely punished the Baltics through non-military means via embargoes etc., the impact would be widely felt in the EU, which at present has demonstrated that it is in a fragile economic state.

Again, I do not see evidence that any war between Russia and a NATO-state is imminent.

With respect to embargoes, Russia has been devesting in the Baltic states since the late 1990s and chiefly since 2001. Russian oil embargoes already exist against the Baltic states, and oil pipelines have been reducing output to nil since 2006. Russia has increased its transit of oil through other states (including Ukraine) to punish the Baltics.

Now, I do agree that further embargoes could hurt the EU, and the EU has no stomach for further economic downturn; but I doubt the European Union or the United States would turn a blind eye to a NATO nation which could be perceived as being under any form of real, physical attack.

And therein lies the difference between Ukraine and a potential "conflict" in Lithuania, for instance. There is a tremendous, undeniable, difference between armed conflict and invasion as is happening in Ukraine and an oil or trade embargo which is within the rights of the Russian government.

The threats posed by the UK defense minister particularly focused on the possibility of cyber terrorism from Russia; however, this is something that can be fairly well mitigated and frankly is not to the level of real terrorism that results in the loss of life or violent attacks against civilians.

So again, we see the fundamental differences between the present-day conflict in Ukraine, and any potential limited "conflict" that might arise in the Baltics.

 

[gourimoko]

Part II

I. Moscow runs its mouth all the time. However, with Russia, actions mean more than words. Russia's increased belligerence toward the Baltics is undeniable and the matter of the violation of Estonian sovereignty is outrageous. The threat is real.

The threat of what though?

With respect to violation of Estonian sovereignty, I'm assuming you're referring to the kidnapping and detention of Eston Kohver? If not please correct me, but I don't see this in any way as being comparable to Russian troops being deployed in Ukraine.

Yes, it is troubling. Yes, there exists a threat of increased border incidents. But again, these are contained, limited occurrences; yes, provocations, yes, aggressive actions against an ally, but I don't think arming the Ukrainians solves this particular issue.

Instead I think we should discuss what would be an appropriate and measured response to the incident, rather than, by way of course, automatically expanding this into a regional conflict spanning the entirety of Russia's land border in Europe and Asia.

II. I disagree with Shapiro. His position is predicated on three flawed assumptions: 1) That the arms will escalate tensions between the US and Russia, possibly leading to military conflict,

Why is this a flawed assumption? From my view, I completely agree with this assessment. It seems quite logical and frankly immediately apparent.

What am I, and Shapiro, missing?

2) That even with the weapons the Ukrainians "can't win,"

This isn't only the position of Shapiro, but of most of the analysts and think tanks that I have researched; including the position of several European defense ministries including Germany and France.

Going back to the conflicting Brookings Institute analyses, the opinion to arm Ukraine was entirely predicated on the notion that increased Russian casualties would lead to the Russian population turning on Putin.

But as Shapiro points out rather smartly in my opinion, that Russians are not ignorant of the facts in Ukraine. They would immediately associate Russian deaths, to which they are keenly sensitive as has been pointed out previously, to their already existing anti-American sentiment.

This, in my view supports his argument that it would only make Russian-American relations worse from a grassroots level, and would increase militarism and nationalistic pride in both Russia and Eastern Ukraine.

I think, again, this further strengthens Putin's position.

Lastly, with respect to any direct military conflict with Russia and Ukraine; I don't have much confidence that an outright invasion of Ukraine, by Russia, could be prevented by the Ukrainian forces; armed or not.

So again, I have little confidence whatsoever that Ukraine can "win" against a direct and concerted invasion from Russia.

and 3) That increased costs in blood and treasure won't make Putin reconsider.

For many reasons that I've pointed out here, where we've somewhat disagreed, I do not believe Putin would "reconsider," nor do I think American weapons and American backed Ukrainian troops would force him to due to public sentiment.

Ukraine is of vital economic and strategic interest to Russia, and I think it's wishful thinking, frankly, to think that a few hundred dead Russians would end an already bloody conflict.

But this brings up an interesting point that I want to touch on in a bit...

First, arming the Ukrainians does no create a proxy conflict. It allows the Ukrainians to defend themselves from an enemy that has superior numbers and weapons. There will be no cooperation between US and Ukrainian militaries.

If we were only selling arms to the Ukrainians, I would agree. But that is not what is being discussed by Congress and our European allies.

Providing arms, to assist the Ukrainians, in the interests of combating Russian aggression is by definition a "proxy war," where we are using the Ukrainians as our proxy.

Angela Merkel has called any attempt to arm the Ukrainians as an escalation leading to a potential "proxy war."

Henry Kissinger has stated that we made grave mistakes in our misunderstanding of the internal conflict in Ukraine, and further compounded that mistake by not only marginalizing the Russians but refusing to involve them in meaningful negotiations. He further went on to state that now arming the Ukrainians would result in a proxy war in which the United States and the Russian Federation would be in conflict; again, escalating tensions, and increasing the threat of a larger war.

The Daily Mail in the United Kingdom headlines articles as:

Threat of proxy war looms as US considers sending arms to Ukraine
Russian troops being killed by US weapons would significantly raise the stakes of the West's standoff with Vladimir Putin

This will not be another Vietnam or Korea. It is more like Lend-Lease.

Agreed. But if you really believe that than surely you understand the context of Lend-Lease and how that program was the prelude to American involvement in World War II.

This isn't lost on analysts opposing arming the Ukrainians today, nor was it lost on Americans in 1941.

To quote the New York Times of the era:
"Col. Knox's speech was designed to prepare Americans¡for the day when Mr. Roosevelt,¡will ask Congress openly to declare war on the Axis.'-'

Official Japanese opinion is crystallised by Asahl, which says: "Latest orders to the US Navy may mark the beginning of a virtual state of war between America and Germany. "

This is bound to develop gradually and without any ultimatum or declaration into open warfare."

So again, I agree with the analogy, but to say that Lend-Lease did not escalate tensions between America and the Axis Powers, that "could potential lead to military conflict" I think is false, and thereby the use of this analogy, I think, undermines your position.

Moreover, there is no further level of escalation the Russians can successful employ against the US. Tensions are already high, Russian propaganda has already whipped up anti-US hysteria. Russia won't attack the US, they have no economic weapons and they can only attack NATO, which is a costly way of sticking to the Americans.

I disagree with this for several reasons.

1) The aforementioned states in the Middle East that are looking for arms and protection from the Russians as it is.

2) An economic "Boomerang Effect" exists wherein increased sanctions and the potential for resulting oil and trade embargoes from Russia against American allies in Europe can (and have already) have substantial economic impact on nations like Germany - the leading economic powerhouse in the European Union.

3) The Russian economy of $2T has already begun to regroup itself in light of it's susceptibility to international sanctions, and begun to look for materials and suppliers outside of Europe. This has had the added consequence of hurting the European economies most dependent on international trade with Russia. There is the risk that we will de-globalize the Russian economy, causing it to become more internally self-supporting; this is important also with respect to the aforementioned issue of Iran.

Thus, I don't think it is correct, in my view, to assert Russia has no economic means of influencing the West. In fact, the conflict in Ukraine is entirely predicated on maintaining those means.

Second, Shapiro's reading of the tactical and strategic situation on the ground is dubious.

Based on what?

No one expects the Ukrainians to drive the Russians and their puppets back to Russia. What we can expect them to do is prevent further Russian advances; all of which have occurred when regular Russian forces employed superior weapons to beat the Ukrainian Army down.

I don't think that's what Shapiro is arguing. I think his report states clearly that Russian forces would merely divide Ukraine along ideological and ethnic lines.

More or less, that it would be virtually impossible for the Ukrainians to prevent the Russians from doing so, and doing so with such force and speed that by the time anyone really knew the facts on the ground, the Russians would have already established a defensive position.

 

[gourimoko]

Part III

The proposed weapons sale will allow the UA to fight on more even terms and inflict serious casualties on Russia and buy more time for the rebuilding of their forces. The goal isn't to defeat the Russian Army; it is to bleed it long enough to bring Russia to the table and to negotiate in good faith. We know this can happen because Russia is near its limit with its military effort. The addition of new weapons will push the Russian ledger of cost/benefit analysis into the red.

But Shapiro states this openly, as do most of the analysts I've cited. His entire argument is predicated on demonstrating why the bolded is not only wishful thinking but inherently flawed, because it assumes that Ukraine is more capable than it is, and that Putin and the Russian military is so incredibly susceptible to public scrutiny that they could not sustain a brief land grab in Eastern Ukraine.

I think Shapiro's point makes perfect sense, to be quite honest. I see no reason to believe Ukraine could hold ground against the Russian Army in a direct open confrontation.

Third, Shapiro's claim of Putin "not being swayed by grieving mothers" is simplistic and a disingenuous characterization of Russian domestic politics. To begin to understand Putin, one must realize that his regime is a Russian version of Bonapartism insofar as his despotic rule is tolerated by the populace, and more importantly, the elites, so long as he wins victories and ensures economic prosperity.

I wouldn't go so far as to say he's being disingenuous. I think his viewpoint is supported by enough analysts as to warrant a fair hearing.

Whereas the bolded, I think, again delves too deeply into attempting to rationalize and explain the conflict as the whims of Vladimir Putin without totally understanding the facts on the ground in Ukraine. This is the exact point that Henry Kissinger brought up with respect to U.S. failures to fully appreciate and understand the nature of the conflict between Ukrainian nationalists and the ethnic Russian minorities in the East.

Everyone supports a war until the body bags come home and with the rearmed UA inflicting heavy losses, the war comes out in the open in Russia.

What if they don't inflict heavy losses? There are no solid estimates of just how many Russians have died as a result, and feelings in Russia against Putin can hardly be considered hostile as a result of the conflict.

I think people are assuming that this conflict will mirror Afghanistan, and I think that is, again, wishful thinking.

Heavy losses undercut Putin's support on the basis of military victory and the ongoing sanctions, coupled with the strain on the economy from prolonged military effort, will continue to gut the economy. Without military victories and faced with economic ruin, Putin will lose popular support, especially with the elites and threats to his rule will increase.

The bolded is supposition predicated on a claim that I think most would agree is unlikely. The Ukrainian forces would not likely be able to push back the Russian Army from Eastern Ukraine. The division of Ukraine itself would be a massive military victory for Russia, and most Russians (and those living in Crimea) supported the move.

I think it's very dangerous to make the assumptions we have here to support an argument that arming the Ukrainians is not without ample risk, and runs a distinct possibility of failure.

As such, the cost in blood and treasure is very much something he takes into consideration of whether to continue to the fighting. Shapiro is simply wrong. When the costs become to high, Putin will come to the table and it won't have anything to do with compassion.

Again, the bolded (your bolding), assumes that these costs will become too high, and he will be forced to the table. I don't think you're considering all the possibilities; or at least, haven't in this post?

It isn't my opinion, or a thought exercise; it is a matter of military science.

Ehh... this could go either way though, as there are many individuals far more learned than I who would (and do) disagree with your position here.

I. Battle is not a hypothetical. For the most part battles or won or lost before a shot is fired. It is no surprise that the Ukrainians have lost a lot of ground recently. Once the Russians decided to send sophisticated weapons to the rebels, and then decided to start sending in entire units of the Russian Army to straight-up fight the US, the Ukrainians were boned. The balance of numbers on the ground was sufficient before Russian intervention because: 1) The number of combatants were acceptable for the UA (near parity), 2) The two sides were comparably equipped with the UA having a slight advantage in heavy weapons and 3) The rebels were poorly led and trained.

II. The Russian intervention completely destroyed that calculus. Now the Russians and rebels outnumber the UA, they outgun them by far and are fighting more effectively thanks to the leadership of highly-trained Russian regular units.

I don't think I disagree with anything you've said here.

Arming the Ukrainians will have the following positive effect:

a) The disparity in numbers is exacerbated by the UA being totally out-matched in weaponry. With US/NATO weaponry, the numbers matter less. The UA would no longer need numbers parity to hold their own: A 3-1 disadvantage in numbers is acceptable on the defense is they have the right weapons.

But if we're going off of Putin's actions and words, as you have here, he has stated openly and frankly, on numerous occasions, that he would intervene, militarily (and thus openly) if the United States were to arm the Ukrainians.

So that numeric disparity would likely increase until Ukrainian conscription forces were trained and deployed.

Lastly, you assert that Ukraine would have a defensive position; but I don't think that would represent the reality of the situation in the aftermath of a concerted Russian invasion. I think the Ukrainian Army would be forced to attempt to retake separatist-now-Russian controlled segments of Eastern Ukraine and would likely fail to do so.

This is further supported by the findings of the Brookings Institute, which states that Ukraine would drag Russia into a prolonged conflict along these divisions that would lead to your proposed conclusion. But not that the Ukrainians could militarily defeat the Russians, or even hold them off.

So what we're talking about isn't really weapons to prevent an invasion, but weapons to prolong an armed conflict in the hopes that the Russians would simply withdraw from Ukraine?

Again, I think that completely ignores the realities that the Russians are faced with if a unified Ukraine is allied (and in this situation completely) with the West.

b) It gives the Ukrainians the upper-hand in a battle of attrition.

Yes, exactly..

Proper defensive weaponry, particularly anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, neutralize the advantage the Russians have on the attack. It makes advances into urban terrain a nightmare and allows the UA to economize and stabilize its front. Importantly, it makes every advance a costly affair which in turn degrades the effectiveness of Russian units and morale. An anti-tank missile is much less costly than a tank and crew. If the UA can effectively start destroying Russian heavy-weapons it will dramatically increase the costs of the war for Russia.

I agree with the bolded. But I do not agree with the implication that it would bring enough political pressure against Putin to stop the war.

c) Russian leadership will mean less when they are no longer able to employ the tactics they prefer with troops who are not afraid of the UA because of their lack of weapons. Not only will Russian doctrine of massed armor attacks, supported by indiscriminate artillery and air cover, be less effective, but far less effective in the face of effective defensive weaponry, but Russian troop morale will sag as casualties mount. Whereas the Ukrainians are fighting for their homeland, Russian soldiers will be far less motivated fighting in a war they can't admit they are in, or could give two shits about.

The bolded isn't actually accurate though, in the sense that Russian leadership has entertained the possibility of an open invasion if the West provides weapons to the Ukrainians. So, no, Russian soldiers could admit where they are; but you're right in saying they might not want to be there.

Either way, again, I think this is dangerous. You're assuming too much, in my view, not leaving room for even the possibility (probability) that Russia can and would sustain a prolonged conflict with one of it's neighbors.

So, yes, the Ukrainians can stop the Russians from further advances, they can and will inflict heavy losses and may even enjoy local successes. To counter the new weapons of the UA, the Russians will either have to straight-up send 20 divisions and start an all-out war (beyond their capabilities) or suffer from a being caught in a stalemate and forced to the table for the reasons enumerated above.

What makes you so confident of the bolded? At a minimum, I think it is a contentious point, but you seem quite sure that Ukraine could more or less defeat Russia in a long-term conflict. I'd like to agree with you, but I don't have any basis at this point to do so.

I'm just curious why you feel Ukraine is in such an advantageous position, when so many disagree?

III. Putin has been playing with house money. He knows his position has been weak vis-à-vis the West and he knows better than anyone else that the only reason he has been successful is because no one has stood up to him. If the costs are high enough, and begin to threaten his personal rule, he will come to the table. Thanks to his propaganda machine, even a reverse in Ukraine can be explained away. He won't look terrible if he can disengage from Ukraine and broker a peace that allows him to keep Crimea and a guarantee that Ukraine won't ever join the EU or NATO.

Crimea isn't even up for negotiation or discussion. Crimea is Russia at this point, and likely always will be.

I would agree that the possibility exists for Russia to withdraw, and politically Putin can turn this into a victory; but not if ethnic Russians and Ukrainian separatists are marginalized in Ukraine and further trade pacts and cooperation agreements are made with the European Union and not Russia.

Simply put, it is not in Russia's best interest to have Ukraine align itself with the West. The creation of a separate and distinct, Russian friendly Ukrainian state is not only achievable it's already happening.

Can Putin walk this back? Possibly. But Ukraine, Europe, and the United States would need to make immense concessions; not only agreeing to the terms you've outlined, but likely surrendering decades long control of Russian oil pipelines in the region which is the key economic factor at play for Ukrainian and European interests.

...Simply put, this situation is anything but simple. It's a highly complex and convoluted conflict between various factions both in Ukraine as well as the various international powers involved. Russia has key economic and strategic interests in the region, and militarily opposes a Western-aligned independent Ukrainian state.

Frankly, I do not see how, at this point, arming the Ukrainians in anyway brings about a desirable end to this conflict.

Instead, I think the United States should contain this situation to Ukraine, and pursue diplomatic, and yes conciliatory, efforts to bring Russia back into the various international conversations they have been excluded from.

 

[Sebastian]

Its going to take me a while to digest this. But, I don't think I have another full back and forth in me considering how complicated the issue is. Suffice to say we disagree on some points on the results of arming the Ukrainians. We both presented arguments that were well written and thoughtful. Essentially, our arguments mirror those of the "experts" insofar as some think Putin would back down after getting a bloody nose, and some don't. But, I would like to clear up a couple points and here is the short version:

Part I:

1. I do make a distinction between the NATO nations and the Ukraine. We fight Russia over the Baltics, we do not with Ukraine. Our involvement with the latter is strictly limited to weapons. Where I do see them both as potentially being in the same boat is that they are all targets when viewed through the lens of Russian Neo-Imperialism.

2. We may disagree at the level with which Russia and the US are once again adversaries, but, it is the case and that won't change for a while. Putin can't achieve his aims with antagonizing the US. So, whatever.

3. You are right about the economy. I could have worded that better.

Part II:

1. I disagree with Shapiro for the reasons outlined. Think tanks support his position, and others refute it. Simply put, I think he is wrong on escalation, because Russia isn't in a position to escalate, wrong about the tactical situation on the ground and the potentiality of the effectiveness of the weapons. I have been receiving regular briefs on the general situation from the Ukraine from US officers in the theater of operations. I have formed my own assessments based off that information and disagree with Shapiro's conclusions.

2. I completely disagree on the characterization of Putin's power base has being so unassailable that a bloody, economically draining conflict won't have a negative effect in Russia. I am not talking about 100s of dead Russians as a result of the increased effectiveness of the Ukrainian Army, I am talking 1000s or more. The report cited a couple of days ago made it clear that Russia's military is under heavy strain and at the limits of endurance to where blocking units are stationed behind Russian formations. Strengthening the UA may push them over the edge.

3. Lend-Lease did not inevitably lead to US involvement in WWII. Had Germany not declared war on the US, there is a very good chance that US does not declare war on Germany. Even after Pearl Harbor, public opinion was very much against another European war.

4. There is a difference between a proxy war and selling arms. Proxy wars are funded, armed and led by one nation against another through another nation. We will neither fund, nor send US personnel to guide, advise and lead Ukrainian troops. This is a weapons transaction that allows a victimized people to defend themselves. There is an iota of difference, not that Moscow cares and not that it matters; they will paint us villains no matter what.

Part III:

1. I think you underestimate the impeachable military reality that effective weaponry in the hands of the defense will inflict heavy casualties on an attacking force. Shapiro grossly underestimates the UA and the value of proper weapons used on the proper terrain. Again, I know the military situation on the ground and:

a) The Ukrainians will be on the defensive so long as Russian forces are involved, the goal is not to retake lost territory but to hold on to what they have and bloody Russia.
b) Holding territory is very much predicated on better weapons. With them they will inflict heavy casualties (which they already have) and prevent the Russians from freely engaging in maneuver warfare.
c) Maneuver warfare is where the Russians dominate the field. If that is taken from them, even in a small measure, it forces them into static and urban battles which the Ukrainians are more than willing to engage in because the disparity in numbers becomes irrelevant and larger weapons systems are less effective (tanks, self-propelled guns, heavy artillery and air strikes) and defensive weapons like anti-tank missiles create a nightmarish situation for attacking troops.

2. Experience in Afghanistan, Georgia and Chechnya is informative (but not analogous) in this context. You state that it is wishful thinking to compare this conflict with Afghanistan. True, they are not the same, however, what we can take from that conflict, and from Chechnya is:

a) Afghanistan does demonstrate the value of high-tech weapons on a military like Russia's that relies squarely on heavy weapons formations and mass attacks. Russian casualties skyrocketed once the US began arming the Afghans.
b) Effective defensive weapons have devastating effects on armored and mechanized formations in urban areas and in difficult terrain. The Russians lost entire armored brigades in Chechnya and suffered catastrophic casualties.
c) Both demonstrate that yes, a motivated force, supported with effective defensive weapons can and will inflict very high casualties on the Russian Army, moreover:
d) Russia has a conscript army that is both corrupt and very prone to low morale even in peacetime. Time and again, the Russian Army has performed poorly once their enemies started hitting back. This has already occurred in the Ukraine to the extent that "Blocking detachments" have been employed to prevent whole units from retreating or deserting.
e) The Ukrainians are better trained and more cohesive force than the Afghans or Chechens ever were. There is no reason to think they cannot do better.

Finally, for reasons stated, Putin may be brought to the table (it is not unprecedented for the Russians to sue for peace) if enough Russians are killed (to put it crudely). I guess we disagree on this. You think I make too many assumptions on the military effectiveness of the weapons and UA to bleed the Bear, and that I am too optimistic about the effect on Putin's grip on authority. I think you and Shapiro take too lightly the effect of such weaponry. Ok, so we probably won't come to an agreement on those points as there is evidence to support both positions. In the end, if the weapons are sent, Putin will either:

1. Escalate the conflict and fully invade Ukraine with the aim of total conquest at which point all pretenses are gone and it is full-on Cold War 2.0 with full economic sanctions and a complete NATO military build-up, in effect surrounding Russia and creating the very conditions he has aimed to prevent, or:
2. He can stay in Eastern Ukraine and absorb increasingly heavy losses while gutting Russian military capability and rising dissatisfaction at home, or:
3. Negotiate in good faith, something he hasn't done, toward an acceptable peace.

That said, I would like to know though, what you think we should do to contain Russian aggression predicated with your various ideas for either scenario:

1. Conflict isn't inevitable as Putin isn't a madman that wants to retake the whole of the former Soviet Empire,

2. Broader conflict is inevitable because Putin is a madman that will try to reconstitute old Soviet borders.

 

[Sumac13]

Very interesting debate/conversation. Learning a lot.

On the last point (to Gourimoko's post Part III), I doubt that Russia with Putin in power will be brought back into international conversations. Realize, Russia to a large extent have excluded themselves from the conversations by refusing to take part, not in a meaningful manner anyway. I don't see it ever happening. So I wouldn't factor him coming to the table into the conversation. The assassination of Nemtsov seems to be a sign of desperation on Putin's part.

I still support going the way of sanctions. But, if Ukraine would be armed, I cannot say I would be disappointed.

If Poroshenko would lose complete confidence of the people, who ever steps in is going to be much less willing to negotiate with Russia. His support is waning. Have to take that into consideration.

I think a non-aligned Ukraine would be best for all. Ukraine. Russia. The West. That would be my end goal.

 

[gourimoko]

Great post @King Stannis , I'll try to get back to you by tomorrow or Monday at the latest. I think we both need time to digest what the other is saying.

Very good conversation!

 

[Sumac13]

Great post @King Stannis , I'll try to get back to you by tomorrow or Monday at the latest. I think we both need time to digest what the other is saying.

Very good conversation!

You think? I need to find time myself to read it all more closely.

 

[OptimusPrime]

We've got Pravda (CNN and company) pounding the drums for war with Russia. I think that is a swell idea. Are these people out of their fucking minds?

 

[Jordan]

Yes.

There wasn't an Iraqi infrastructure or system capable of having free, fair elections, or even running the country, in the first few years. We tried to move them along as quickly as possible to being in the position to run their own country. And there were elections.

Wholly apart from watching Iraqis actually voting, I personally know a shitload of Americans over there, some in positions of significant authority, who wanted nothing more than to have a stable, democratic Iraqi government.



That was my entire point. I was disputing the claim that the alleged lack of U.S. interest in democracy somehow caused what's happened in Fallujah.

It didn't.

Sorry I haven't responded. I was moving apartments and it's been exhausting. I really do see where you are coming from, though.

So, let me rephrase my argument about democracy. I think U.S. military men and advisors do want democracy in Iraq. I also did not mean to imply that people in Washington did not want democracy. My argument is that, following the toppling of Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration attempted to engage in the Rosseta Stone of democracy. Unfortunately, as you said, Iraq did not have the infrastructure. As the conflict between realist interests (security, stability, etc.) conflated with the neoconservative elements in the Bush administration (principle, democracy, human rights, etc.) the former won out. This is because the American people faced a contradiction. As Americans we claim to fight for democracy, however, we did not want our troops in Iraq for 20 years, and that is perfectly reasonable. What occurred, though, because of this conflation of factors was a forcing by policy makers in Washington to "fast-track" democracy and stability in Iraq. Thus, Nouri al-Maliki, who attempted to make the Sunnis pay for Saddam Hussein, was placed into power. This led to Al-Qaeda in Iraq to take hold by attacking the insecurities and fear Sunnis had of Maliki, his government, and by association the United States.

In fact, neoconservative scholar Fouad Ajami's book The ForeignersGift, problematic for many reasons, did provide excellent analysis of the various political actors who wanted democracy in Iraq. While his views of the conflict and mine are very different, what he makes clear though, is that there were many non-sectarian actors desiring democracy in Iraq. These included Kurds, Sunnis, and Shias; however, Washington policy makers ended up seeking stability rather than empowering any of these leaders.

One last addition, saying there were elections is bullshit. Elections are a result of the institutions. The institutions built by the United States resulted in the exact results Washington wanted. Additionally, if elections are what defines democracy, and you believe the U.S. does seek democracy, than you need to explain Washington's unwillingness to work with Morsi in Egypt. Now, I do not believe you feel that way. I think we agree on the lack of true democratic interests in U.S. foreign policy. I do believe this is problematic and this is my concern when people claim "Obama should arm ____ rebels in order to fight for democracy." If there was any track record of this I wouldn't have an issue with this claim, but there is very little of any, especially in recent history.

 

[Sumac13]

We've got Pravda (CNN and company) pounding the drums for war with Russia. I think that is a swell idea. Are these people out of their fucking minds?

So Pravda--a Russian paper which is owned by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation--is telling...who exactly? … to go to war with Russia? Your comment makes little sense. Also, are you suggesting that CNN and company are in reality the Communist Party of the Russian Federation? Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha.

Please, provide source for you claims. I'm curious.

 

[CleveRocks]

Sorry I haven't responded. I was moving apartments and it's been exhausting. I really do see where you are coming from, though.

.....
I do believe this is problematic and this is my concern when people claim "Obama should arm ____ rebels in order to fight for democracy." If there was any track record of this I wouldn't have an issue with this claim, but there is very little of any, especially in recent history.

We are not talking about arming rebels. We are talking about arming The recognized Government of Ukraine. Its Putin who is claiming to arm "pro - russian rebels" when he actually has russion troops on the ground.

The Ukranian Government is messy, and no doubt rife with Russian infiltration. That is the elephant in the room. If we trusted Ukraine's government, shipping the defensive arms would be a no brainer. I think you all know I am no fan of the President, but I dont believe it is cowardice that has him hemhawing here. I think it is uncertainty over the partner.

The problem is that we were wholly unprepared for what has been a long term russian campaign to gain access to the southern ports. The government of Ukraine was infiltrated and corrupted years before the guns went off. If we can identify who is on our side, I cant see any downside to arming them to the teeth..

As for the Baltics, now is the time to clean up that situation. We should make it clear that they are Nato Allies, and no invasion will be tolerated. If we dont do that, then the risk is that some if the elite in those countries could decide that they will eventually be russian anyway, and they will cut deals now to be part of the new Pro Russian Rebels when that time comes.. I think Stannis is right, we have to make the cost of russian adventurism as high as possible to curb his enthusiasm..

 

[Jordan]

We are not talking about arming rebels. We are talking about arming The recognized Government of Ukraine. Its Putin who is claiming to arm "pro - russian rebels" when he actually has russion troops on the ground.

The Ukranian Government is messy, and no doubt rife with Russian infiltration. That is the elephant in the room. If we trusted Ukraine's government, shipping the defensive arms would be a no brainer. I think you all know I am no fan of the President, but I dont believe it is cowardice that has him hemhawing here. I think it is uncertainty over the partner.

The problem is that we were wholly unprepared for what has been a long term russian campaign to gain access to the southern ports. The government of Ukraine was infiltrated and corrupted years before the guns went off. If we can identify who is on our side, I cant see any downside to arming them to the teeth..

As for the Baltics, now is the time to clean up that situation. We should make it clear that they are Nato Allies, and no invasion will be tolerated. If we dont do that, then the risk is that some if the elite in those countries could decide that they will eventually be russian anyway, and they will cut deals now to be part of the new Pro Russian Rebels when that time comes.. I think Stannis is right, we have to make the cost of russian adventurism as high as possible to curb his enthusiasm..

Right, but if you read my previous post as well as the one I was quoting my position is abundantly clear. This comment was a response to @The Human Q-Tip's point about my feelings of democracy and U.S. foreign policy.

I'm not going to re-hash everything here but I ultimately see both arming and not-arming problematic for a variety of reasons. If you are interested in the rest, read my last post in this threat.

 

[CleveRocks]

I went back and read your posts a second time, and i dont think they are as clear as you hope..But they are decent analysis..

I dont have the bandwidth (or perhaps staff) to do the kind of posting Gour does, so I wont belabor it. But my point is that Ukraine is an entirely different dynamic than Afghanistan or Iraq, or syria for that matter. Its not a cultural mismatch, it is a straight land grab by a megalomaniac. Whether Putin is Stalin or Hitlerish, no diference. He is ruling Russia with propoganda and nationalism, and we all know where that leads. Apeasement and otherwise wringing hands, or negotiating with them when we know they will not abide by it, is not a path to success. We have real allies in the Baltics, and if we let them slip back into russian hegemony, we will have lost everything in terms of european stability that we gained with the fall of the berlin wall.

 

[OptimusPrime]

So Pravda--a Russian paper which is owned by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation--is telling...who exactly? … to go to war with Russia? Your comment makes little sense. Also, are you suggesting that CNN and company are in reality the Communist Party of the Russian Federation? Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha.

Please, provide source for you claims. I'm curious.

I was talking about our Pravda, meaning CNN, Fox, NBC, and the major newspapers. And I don't mean today's Pravda, I mean the original. I guess talking about Russia I should have chosen a different state propaganda agency to make my point to avoid confusion. Anyway, the U.S. propaganda arm is pounding the war drums.

http://www.paulcraigroberts.org/2015/03/14/cnn-beating-drums-war-paul-craig-roberts/