The ISIS offensive in Iraq

[gourimoko]

Sorry I meant Iran, not SA. My bad on this one. I was writing a paper on SA at the same time.



Right, that's fair. Iran wants to be taken seriously on a world stage. So weapons deal with that. Overall, though, sanctions prevent it. Iran wants to rival up against the Saudis for more control in the Middle East.



Which is the only reason I support sanctions. But, how much they will actually be able to empirically support is uncertain. If there was a study that could quantifiably prove it then I really would listen.



Yeah, we did happen to find WMDs in Iraq... Last I checked government's don't hold monopolies on information. The regime is not as totalitarian as you seem to be making it out to be. Most people, surprised or not, really enjoy living in Iran. Their control, up until 2009, was supported by most citizens. In 2009, following sanctions and the global recession, the business class revolted and were crushed by the regime.



I was pretty certain I did supply evidence in the name of a book by Vali Nasr, Islamic Capitalism. He spends three chapters on the subject I just briefly touched upon using Iranian economic documents and U.S. trade documents. If I forgot to bring him up that was my mistake.



That is why they were celebrating. The sanctions hurt their well-being.



That's a fair point. And again, why I support removing sanctions. I'll buy your argument for the sake of an internet debate (although, please do read Vali Nasr's book if you get a chance because he addresses it in more detail) and it leads to the same conclusion. Washington has not attempted in any way to aid the powerful and numerous middle-class and youth in Iran who oppose the regime (this is statistically valid. Most people living in the Middle East are young and most youth in Iran are engaged in capitalist enterprises. For more info check out the Economist Intelligence Unit's stats on this). Sanctions hurt the business classes that currently oppose the clerics.



Are they really worse than any of our other regional partners? I don't think the Saudis are anymore trustworthy than Iran.



In response to my statistics you said "It would be politically impossible for the President to cut off support for Israel." Note, I never said cut off all aid but, more specifically, focused on how the aid was allocated. Care to explain your point? Can or can't the U.S. change its policy towards Israel?


Two points: First, can you provide any evidence suggesting the president views Iran as the better ally than Israel?

Secondly, and perhaps more important to the impact our debate can have on the region, do you really value the stability of regimes like the Saudis? Does that stability outweigh humanitarian goals to you? I do not think Obama is a humanitarian, and as you and I have agreed on, that is a huge issue with this nuclear agreement. I guess I am not disagreeing with your argument here, but moreso, your value-criterion. I do not value stability of totalitarian regimes, whether they be the Saudis, Iranians, Assad, etc. over pretty much anything else, ever.

Plus one.

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

Right, that's fair. Iran wants to be taken seriously on a world stage. So weapons deal with that. Overall, though, sanctions prevent it. Iran wants to rival up against the Saudis for more control in the Middle East. Which is the only reason I support sanctions. But, how much they will actually be able to empirically support is uncertain. If there was a study that could quantifiably prove it then I really would listen.

The problem with any such studies is that they are necessarily going to be based on woefully inadequate data (given that we do not have full access to the exact condition of the Iranian economy), and would involve guessing how Iranian leadership would respond to reduced income.

But do we really need a quantifying study to know that the impact would be significant? Iran is at least promising to reduce its efforts to build a nuke, something it previously said it would never consider. Would Iran really backtrack like that unless the economic/military benefts were significant?

I think it's important to note that Iran showed this limited flexibility only after the crash in oil prices, which a lot of analysts believe are really hurting the country. Seems to me that is exactly the time when you ratchet up the sanctions to get a better deal, because it's the time at which they're most vulnerable to their effects.

The regime is not as totalitarian as you seem to be making it out to be. Most people, surprised or not, really enjoy living in Iran.

That's the core, underlying reason why there hasn't been a successful revolution in Iran. People who really enjoy living in a nation generally aren't going to want to risk their lives in a revolution.

Their control, up until 2009, was supported by most citizens. In 2009, following sanctions and the global recession, the business class revolted and were crushed by the regime.

This honestly proves my point, I think. First, a revolution that essentially involves only the business class is not going to succeed anyway, unless the regime, for whatever reason, declines to use force. Shit, the Shah himself may have been able to hold on except he basically called off the security services.

But second, if true, it tells us that Iranians are perfectly content with letting things go on the way they were -- supporting Hezbollah and Hamas, financing other terrorism, attempting to destabilize Iraq and other nations, etc..., being a prime cheerleader for destroying Israel and killing jews, as long as the economy is going okay. So removing economic sanctions and helping their economy would seem to be the last thing you'd want to do if you supported changing regimes, or were trying to discourage meddling in the region.

I was pretty certain I did supply evidence in the name of a book by Vali Nasr, Islamic Capitalism. He spends three chapters on the subject I just briefly touched upon using Iranian economic documents and U.S. trade documents. If I forgot to bring him up that was my mistake.

I was referring to the specific claim that the only reason the 2009 revolution failed was because the business class couldn't buy weapons. The success or failure of a revolution depends upon a whole ton of factors, not just whether the revolutionaries class have enough money to buy weapons. There have been scads of books and articles written on the subject, and I've read a fair number of them. So I don't think dueling authors really constitutes evidence in that respect.

Washington has not attempted in any way to aid the powerful and numerous middle-class and youth in Iran who oppose the regime (this is statistically valid. Most people living in the Middle East are young and most youth in Iran are engaged in capitalist enterprises. For more info check out the Economist Intelligence Unit's stats on this). Sanctions hurt the business classes that currently oppose the clerics.

If you want us to directly aid revolutionaries in Iran, we can have that discussion. But that's a different issue from saying that lifting economic sanctions will promote revolution because it will strengthen the business classes. I'm sure you've heard of the "Theory of Rising Expectations" as a cause for revolution, but those expectations must be unfulfilled to promote revolution. As you said above, the business classes were perfectly happen in Iran until the economy went south, then they rebelled. An improving economic picture, which is what you'd get with lifting sanctions, makes revolution less likely. That's not just theory -- that's what actually happened in Iran.

Now, I don't doubt that the business class may be saying something different, but of course, why wouldn't they? They do want the sanctions lifted, and if saying that lifting the sanctions will destabilize the regime will help get them lifted...of course they'll claim that.

I'll respond to the rest of your points later. Good discussion, though. Thanks.

 

[gourimoko]

Not trying to get into this debate too much, but this stood out to me:

The problem with any such studies is that they are necessarily going to be based on woefully inadequate data (given that we do not have full access to the exact condition of the Iranian economy), and would involve guessing how Iranian leadership would respond to reduced income.

Translation: I don't know of any studies or empirical data to support my claims?

I think it's important to note that Iran showed this limited flexibility only after the crash in oil prices, which a lot of analysts believe are really hurting the country. Seems to me that is exactly the time when you ratchet up the sanctions to get a better deal, because it's the time at which they're most vulnerable to their effects.

According to the latest reports, by the most conservative estimates, Iran has a breakout time of two to three months. Many argue that Iran already has enough fissile material.

However, without a deal, as in a deal right now, Iran will certainly not only have enough fissile material to construct several devices, but the industry in place to manufacture nuclear weapons of various types.

In other words, without an immediate deal this year, Iran becomes a nuclear state.

So no, we can't "ratchet up" sanctions as Netanyahu proposes. It would result in the exact opposite result we hope to achieve, which is a non-nuclear Iran.

This would almost assuredly necessitate a full-scale invasion (which is likely what many involved are hoping for).

This honestly proves my point, I think. First, a revolution that essentially involves only the business class is not going to succeed anyway, unless the regime, for whatever reason, declines to use force. Shit, the Shah himself may have been able to hold on except he basically called off the security services.

The bolded is completely inaccurate, and we've been over this before. Citations can be found in posts by myself and @jking948 .

Lastly, I don't think anyone meant a revolution that was solely composed of the business class; but one backed by the business class. There is a fundamental difference there.

But second, if true, it tells us that Iranians are perfectly content with letting things go on the way they were -- supporting Hezbollah and Hamas,

Is this surprising to you?

attempting to destabilize Iraq

Lol.. the irony here is astounding.

and other nations, etc..., being a prime cheerleader for destroying Israel and killing jews, as long as the economy is going okay.

Destroying Israel, their chief rival?

With respect to "Jews," yeah, you'll get no argument from me to defend anti-semitism, fuck all of that... we at least agree on something. But I will say that more often than not they reference Zionists and not "Jews."

"In Islamic countries Jews, like the adherents of other religions—Christians and Muslims—live side by side with them. In our country we have Jews, Christians, Muslims, and adherents of other religions, and they all live in a secure environment provided by the Islamic government. We are not talking about anti-Semitism. We are talking about the aggressive, usurper, and cruel Zionists, which they misrepresent as anti-Semitism, whereas today the Westerners themselves are afflicted with anti-Islam and anti-Muslim disease. Observe the Western world in which they provoke anti-Muslim waves and support them; they support those who insult Islam and the great Prophet of Islam. This is being anti-Islam."

http://bostonreview.net/world/ganji-khamenei-israel

But, IMHO, he's an anti-semite whether he claims to be one or not.. However, not all or even most Iranians are, and most are capable of making the distinction between Israelis, Zionists, and Jews; all of which are three very distinct things.

So removing economic sanctions and helping their economy would seem to be the last thing you'd want to do if you supported changing regimes, or were trying to discourage meddling in the region.

Again, if we do not act immediately, Iran will have a nuclear weapons industry.

It's as simple as that. We don't have more time.

I was referring to the specific claim that the only reason the 2009 revolution failed was because the business class couldn't buy weapons. The success or failure of a revolution depends upon a whole ton of factors, not just whether the revolutionaries class have enough money to buy weapons. There have been scads of books and articles written on the subject, and I've read a fair number of them. So I don't think dueling authors really constitutes evidence in that respect.

Can you cite a few that support your claims? What books have you read that supports your argument?

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

Are they really worse than any of our other regional partners?

Yes. They're much, much worse. The government of Iran has been directly funding, on a large scale, a variety of terrorist organizations throughout the Mideast. It deliberately supported Shi'ite radical militias in Iraq, which caused a great many Iraqi and U.S. deaths, and even, despite the Sunni/Shi'ite divide, provided a safe haven for AQ personnel, simply because that hurt the U.S.. They've been the primary supporters of Hamas and Hezbollah, whose biggest accomplishment is to provide Israel with an reason (or excuse, depending on your POV) not to move further along in a peace process.

Regional allies such as Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States don't do that.

I don't think the Saudis are anymore trustworthy than Iran.

There are certainly elements within SA that engage in some similar activity, though not nearly on the same scale as Iran. And the top levels of the Saudi government are certainly more cooperative with us than is Iran. After all, the did boot OBL out of SA years before 9/11. They've actively raided and engaged in gunfights with radical cells, etc.. They're clearly not perfect, but they're better than Iran.

In response to my statistics you said "It would be politically impossible for the President to cut off support for Israel." Note, I never said cut off all aid but, more specifically, focused on how the aid was allocated. Care to explain your point? Can or can't the U.S. change its policy towards Israel?

The underlying argument was how this Administration views Israel, and you pointed to the fact that we give Israel aid as evidence that this Administration views Israel positively. I simply pointed out that Congressional/public opinion limits the Administration's practical ability to cut off or reduce that aid, and that the continued existence of that aid therefore does not tell us much about how the Administration itself views Israel.

So yes, the Administration has some flexibility with respect to Israel, but it is limited. For example, last year, the WSJ reported that the Administration changed the process by which Israel purchased arms and ammunition, requiring all such purchases to go through the State Department rather than the Pentagon. the purpose was to delay Israel's ability to acquire those munitions.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sway-over-israel-on-gaza-at-a-low-1407979365

Two points: First, can you provide any evidence suggesting the president views Iran as the better ally than Israel?

I didn't say better ally. I said more sympathetically. But I'd add that I haven't seen anything other than the obligatory minimum from this Administration suggesting that Israel is, or will ever be, a positive force in that region, that compares with Obama's recent comments about Iran's potential for the same.

Secondly, and perhaps more important to the impact our debate can have on the region, do you really value the stability of regimes like the Saudis? Does that stability outweigh humanitarian goals to you?

Stability is a neutral attribute, because what matters is exactly what you're stabilizing, and what the alternatives are. If the House of Saud goes, what is most likely to replace it? If the mullahs were to go in Iran, what is most likely to replace them?

Obviously, we'd prefer the Saudis to change their human rights policies in a number of areas. In fact, we'd like most of the countries in that region to change their human rights policies as well. For example, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have the death penalty for homosexuality. Not good. And as I've pointed out repeatedly, just about every nation in that region represses the free exercise of religion, and freedom of speech.

And the reality is that we simply cannot force all those desired internal changes on all of those nations. That's when we get accused of western imperialism and meddling. And we have to be cognizant of the possibility that deliberately destabilizing a regime with a poor human rights record may result in that power vacuum being filled by something that is even worse.

So as a practical matter, the degree to which a particular government, as a matter of policy, exports violence, extremism, and terrorism, is going to largely determine our stance towards that nation. The other major consideration is what is the most likely alternative if that government is replaced.

 

[Jordan]

The problem with any such studies is that they are necessarily going to be based on woefully inadequate data (given that we do not have full access to the exact condition of the Iranian economy), and would involve guessing how Iranian leadership would respond to reduced income.

But the thing is they do tell part of the picture. They tell just as much, if not more, than statements from the Clerics do. Also, the Economist Intelligence Unit, which a lot of the data is based on, happens to be pretty historically accurate for country's without a lot of available info.

But do we really need a quantifying study to know that the impact would be significant? Iran is at least promising to reduce its efforts to build a nuke, something it previously said it would never consider. Would Iran really backtrack like that unless the economic/military benefts were significant?

Yes, because the sanctions mainly effect the business class. So we do need a study showing how much they would impact Iran's weapon spending.

I think it's important to note that Iran showed this limited flexibility only after the crash in oil prices, which a lot of analysts believe are really hurting the country. Seems to me that is exactly the time when you ratchet up the sanctions to get a better deal, because it's the time at which they're most vulnerable to their effects.

Right, and also because of Rohani taking power. Not that he is any sort of moderate but he is more than any other Iranian president in recent history. All of this reflects how the oil crash combined with sanctions is hurting the business class. The government still needs to respond to its people or it will be overthrown. So maybe you are right, but I would be concerned that increasing sanctions at a time of hurt will significantly increase Shi'a anti-Americanism. This could, in fact, decrease any likelihood of an agreement which means war is coming.

That's the core, underlying reason why there hasn't been a successful revolution in Iran. People who really enjoy living in a nation generally aren't going to want to risk their lives in a revolution.

I would posit that there the Green Movement was just as much a revolution as what occurred in Bahrain. And that goes to my point, people can't wage a successful revolution without means. When the business class is struggling because they can barely feed their families the idea of a revolution is secondary.

This honestly proves my point, I think. First, a revolution that essentially involves only the business class is not going to succeed anyway, unless the regime, for whatever reason, declines to use force. Shit, the Shah himself may have been able to hold on except he basically called off the security services.

Right, but the GM was financed (barely) by the business class but also included many from rural Iran.

But second, if true, it tells us that Iranians are perfectly content with letting things go on the way they were -- supporting Hezbollah and Hamas, financing other terrorism, attempting to destabilize Iraq and other nations, etc..., being a prime cheerleader for destroying Israel and killing jews, as long as the economy is going okay. So removing economic sanctions and helping their economy would seem to be the last thing you'd want to do if you supported changing regimes, or were trying to discourage meddling in the region.

But the Iranians are not perfectly content with letting things continue. It is why the GM occurred in 2009 and why last year's election resulted in the most moderate Iranian leader ever being elected President. There was a study in the Washington Post that examined Iranian feelings and Khomeini was the second choice for people who wanted a less-fanatical leader.

I was referring to the specific claim that the only reason the 2009 revolution failed was because the business class couldn't buy weapons. The success or failure of a revolution depends upon a whole ton of factors, not just whether the revolutionaries class have enough money to buy weapons. There have been scads of books and articles written on the subject, and I've read a fair number of them. So I don't think dueling authors really constitutes evidence in that respect.

That's totally fair. My point, alongside with weapons, is that they did not have enough capital (political, economic, influential, etc.) to wage a strong revolution.

If you want us to directly aid revolutionaries in Iran, we can have that discussion. But that's a different issue from saying that lifting economic sanctions will promote revolution because it will strengthen the business classes. I'm sure you've heard of the "Theory of Rising Expectations" as a cause for revolution, but those expectations must be unfulfilled to promote revolution. As you said above, the business classes were perfectly happen in Iran until the economy went south, then they rebelled. An improving economic picture, which is what you'd get with lifting sanctions, makes revolution less likely. That's not just theory -- that's what actually happened in Iran.

The business classes started being frustrated when Ahmadinejad took over. Green movement began fomenting in around 2006 as a variety of people furious with their potential life-gains. It took hold in 2009 after the elections. People dislike the regime for a whole bunch of reasons. Unfortunately, the Iranian moderates -- who dislike the regime -- do not have enough capital to fight against the Iranian conservatives. It's why the 2009 elections combined with dwindling economic prospects resulted in the GM.

Now, I don't doubt that the business class may be saying something different, but of course, why wouldn't they? They do want the sanctions lifted, and if saying that lifting the sanctions will destabilize the regime will help get them lifted...of course they'll claim that.

Because this is not a new trend? The business class has been vocally opposed to the regime since the mid-90s.

Yes. They're much, much worse. The government of Iran has been directly funding, on a large scale, a variety of terrorist organizations throughout the Mideast. It deliberately supported Shi'ite radical militias in Iraq, which caused a great many Iraqi and U.S. deaths, and even, despite the Sunni/Shi'ite divide, provided a safe haven for AQ personnel, simply because that hurt the U.S.. They've been the primary supporters of Hamas and Hezbollah, whose biggest accomplishment is to provide Israel with an reason (or excuse, depending on your POV) not to move further along in a peace process.

Regional allies such as Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States don't do that.

Yeah, Egypt is great to its population. Sisi is perhaps the most brutal dictator in the Middle East right now. If you support Egypt because of their stability you are cognizant what you are supporting is a totalitarian regime.

There are certainly elements within SA that engage in some similar activity, though not nearly on the same scale as Iran. And the top levels of the Saudi government are certainly more cooperative with us than is Iran. After all, the did boot OBL out of SA years before 9/11. They've actively raided and engaged in gunfights with radical cells, etc.. They're clearly not perfect, but they're better than Iran.

You do realize Saudi Arabia funded ISIS don't you? This is just the first article I pulled up (http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/29098-meet-saudi-arabia-s-new-frankenstein#) but there are many others. ISIS is currently waging a genocide. If you are going to say that "now they are helping us fight ISIS" so is Iran (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/w...in-the-battle-against-islamic-state.html?_r=3).

The underlying argument was how this Administration views Israel, and you pointed to the fact that we give Israel aid as evidence that this Administration views Israel positively. I simply pointed out that Congressional/public opinion limits the Administration's practical ability to cut off or reduce that aid, and that the continued existence of that aid therefore does not tell us much about how the Administration itself views Israel.

So yes, the Administration has some flexibility with respect to Israel, but it is limited. For example, last year, the WSJ reported that the Administration changed the process by which Israel purchased arms and ammunition, requiring all such purchases to go through the State Department rather than the Pentagon. the purpose was to delay Israel's ability to acquire those munitions.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sway-over-israel-on-gaza-at-a-low-1407979365

But if I am correct it had no effect? Israel received those munitions one week later. Also, Israel was using those weapons to bomb hospitals in Palestine this summer for "self-defense" so I'm confused to your point. Real change would be like what we just saw with Egypt, where thankfully, the administration suspended military aid for months and last week, when they reinstituted it, Egypt can no longer buy with credit. Signaling a check on Egypt should human rights abuses continue and/or get worse.

I didn't say better ally. I said more sympathetically. But I'd add that I haven't seen anything other than the obligatory minimum from this Administration suggesting that Israel is, or will ever be, a positive force in that region, that compares with Obama's recent comments about Iran's potential for the same.

Israel was a positive force during the Cold War. A really positive force. But just as Saudi Arabia was, now it is time for change, and the U.S.-Israel policy does need to change.

Stability is a neutral attribute, because what matters is exactly what you're stabilizing, and what the alternatives are. If the House of Saud goes, what is most likely to replace it? If the mullahs were to go in Iran, what is most likely to replace them?

Obviously, we'd prefer the Saudis to change their human rights policies in a number of areas. In fact, we'd like most of the countries in that region to change their human rights policies as well. For example, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have the death penalty for homosexuality. Not good. And as I've pointed out repeatedly, just about every nation in that region represses the free exercise of religion, and freedom of speech.

And the reality is that we simply cannot force all those desired internal changes on all of those nations. That's when we get accused of western imperialism and meddling. And we have to be cognizant of the possibility that deliberately destabilizing a regime with a poor human rights record may result in that power vacuum being filled by something that is even worse.

So as a practical matter, the degree to which a particular government, as a matter of policy, exports violence, extremism, and terrorism, is going to largely determine our stance towards that nation. The other major consideration is what is the most likely alternative if that government is replaced.

Where did I say we should intervene militarily? The only country where I think an argument could've been made between 2011-2013 was Syria but now even that is unrealistic. With that said, the administration could change its military aid and general aid policies to act as a check against human rights abuses. Saudi Arabia and Israel are not Iran and actually get good use out of that military aid. The other thing we could do is finally fund some of the moderate groups in these countries that stand up for greater socioeconomic equality (not socialism, mind you). We could oppose the Saudis action in Yemen and in Bahrain when they killed Shi'as first and asked questions latter. All of which could be done without a military intervention.

Good discussion, though. Thanks.

Totally agree. The one thing about academia is your viewpoint is argued less than others. I really do respect your opinions and am learning a lot from this conversation.

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

But the thing is they do tell part of the picture. They tell just as much, if not more, than statements from the Clerics do. Also, the Economist Intelligence Unit, which a lot of the data is based on, happens to be pretty historically accurate for country's without a lot of available info...Yes, because the sanctions mainly effect the business class.... So we do need a study showing how much they would impact Iran's weapon spending..

I'd agree that you can get data regarding part of the economic picture. But trying to draw a reliable quantitative analysis of how much they would actually support shipping weapons overseas isn't going to work. Part of that calculus is what the mullahs would decide to do in the future, and even they probably don't even know that. Heck, we don't even know what our economy is going to be like 3 years from now, nor do we know exactly how we'll respond to changing events in the future. Reliably quantifying something that depends so much on inherently political decisions that will be made in the future is impossible, and that's leaving the purely economic part out of it completely. What we do know is that even now, while under some sanctions, they're continue to support insurgencies and terrorism throughout the region. Logically, if we reduced those sanctions without any agreement to reduce terrorism, that support would increase, even if we can't quantify how much.

Right, and also because of Rohani taking power. Not that he is any sort of moderate but he is more than any other Iranian president in recent history. All of this reflects how the oil crash combined with sanctions is hurting the business class. The government still needs to respond to its people or it will be overthrown. So maybe you are right....

That's what happened in 2009, so at least we have actual evidence that worsening economic conditions leads to unrest.

but I would be concerned that increasing sanctions at a time of hurt will significantly increase Shi'a anti-Americanism. This could, in fact, decrease any likelihood of an agreement which means war is coming.

Where is the evidence of that? Again, the only evidence we have is what happened in 2009 -- which would be more severe now because of the oil price collapse -- and that anger was directed against the regime. In any case, what's the likelihood that if the business class succeeded the mullahs, they'd actually increase support for terrorism and thereby trigger more sanctions?

I would posit that there the Green Movement was just as much a revolution as what occurred in Bahrain. And that goes to my point, people can't wage a successful revolution without means. When the business class is struggling because they can barely feed their families the idea of a revolution is secondary.

Your argument is that reducing sanctions will somehow trigger a revolution. Is there any evidence of that at all? As far as I can tell, the evidence is that Iranians may rebel if they blame the regime for worsening economic conditions. I don't think there's any evidence that Iranians will rebel when economic conditions improve. I mean, it's a theory that the Iranian business class is no doubt very eager to push, because they want the sanctions lifted. And if they have to tell gullible Americans that a rebellion is more likely if sanctions are reversed, why not? I wouldn't blame them.

But the Iranians are not perfectly content with letting things continue. It is why the GM occurred in 2009 and why last year's election resulted in the most moderate Iranian leader ever being elected President.

Well, you said earlier that Iranians were "very happy", and that it was bad economic that times led to the GM.

The business classes started being frustrated when Ahmadinejad took over. Green movement began fomenting in around 2006 as a variety of people furious with their potential life-gains. It took hold in 2009 after the elections. People dislike the regime for a whole bunch of reasons. Unfortunately, the Iranian moderates -- who dislike the regime -- do not have enough capital to fight against the Iranian conservatives. It's why the 2009 elections combined with dwindling economic prospects resulted in the GM.

Again, I'm failing to see how this supports the idea that better economic times will trigger a revolution. In all honesty, that seems like a very self-serving theory being advanced by Iranian businessmen eager to make more money.

Iran really doesn't have to worry about a neighbor providing safe haven for enemy troops in a civil war -- the only neighbors who'd like to see the mullahs go would be too afraid of triggering Iranian military attacks on their own country. So, since "outside" forces aren't available, the key to a successful revolution in Iran is the loyalty of the military and basij. If you had enough anger among the populace to overwhelm the basij, and the military wouldn't shoot at its own people, it might work. But I just don't see how you're going to get such huge numbers of people to risk their lives in street battles during good economic times.

I'll respond to the rest separately.

 

[Jordan]

@The Human Q-Tip I eagerly await the rest.

In the meantime, to all four of you reading this thread, here are three article I published in my program's student journal. You should read them, or don't, up to you.

https://gmumessa.wordpress.com/2015/04/13/humanitarian-disaster-a-story-of-syrias-barrel-bombs/

https://gmumessa.wordpress.com/2015/04/04/syrias-agricultural-economy-prior-to-the-uprisings/

https://gmumessa.wordpress.com/2015...-thomas-pierrets-religion-and-state-in-syria/

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

I eagerly await the rest.

Just as an initial point, Egypt or any other nation sucking does not make Iran's leadership one iota better, and doesn't make Iran any better as a potential partner for peace. It's support of terrorism and destabilization dwarfs that of anyone else in the region. They're the primary supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah, which essentially make any peace with Israel impossible.. Iran's support for radical Shi'ite militias in Iraq was probably the single biggest factor in fomenting civil war. Senior U.S. military personnel have attributed one-third of U.S. casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq to Iranian proxies. Iran also has boots on the ground in Syria and Yemen.

There is not the slightest reason to believe any of that is going to change at all.

Sisi is perhaps the most brutal dictator in the Middle East right now. If you support Egypt because of their stability you are cognizant what you are supporting is a totalitarian regime.

As an aside, we didn't put Sisi in place, and when there was a rebellion against Mubarak, U.S. pressure was a major element in the Egyptian military not cracking down. Nor did we engineer a coup against Morsi -- Egypt's military did that.

But, I'll point out that the Muslim Brotherhood that replaced Mubarak was no better, and worse in some respects. As King Abdullah of Jordan stated, the MB were "wolves in sheeps' clothing." So yeah, Sisi sucks. I'd still rather he be running Egypt that the mullahs be running Iran, because at least Egypt is interested in regional peace. Iran isn't.

You do realize Saudi Arabia funded ISIS don't you?

Yes, though the government cut off support awhile back and is now cooperating with efforts against them. But, the whole reason for that support in the first place was the relentless Iranian support of radical Shi'ite groups in Iraq, and of its proxies like Syria. The Saudi support to the predecessors of ISIS was to combat Iran, which is why Iranian meddling is so destructive to regional stability. As I'm sure you know, the Arab states of the ME generally don't want the non-Arab Iranians messing with their countries.

Real change would be like what we just saw with Egypt, where thankfully, the administration suspended military aid for months and last week, when they reinstituted it, Egypt can no longer buy with credit. Signaling a check on Egypt should human rights abuses continue and/or get worse.

I've got no problem with pressuring Egypt to have more respect for human rights. I just don't see what that has to do with Iran.

Israel was a positive force during the Cold War. A really positive force. But just as Saudi Arabia was, now it is time for change, and the U.S.-Israel policy does need to change.

Just to be clear, you're talking about Iran replacing Israel and Saudi Arabia as a positive force in the region? Because that's the line the Administration has leaked, and it is utterly divorced from reality.

Where did I say we should intervene militarily?

I didn't say you did. I was asking whether you advocated that the U.S. provide support in the form of weapons, etc. to this group of nascent rebels/businessmen in Iran -- not committing U.S. military forces directly.

Totally agree. The one thing about academia is your viewpoint is argued less than others. I really do respect your opinions and am learning a lot from this conversation.

It's interesting for me to see what some in academia are saying now as well. Undergrad was a very long time ago for me, but it was noteworthy because I was in a military academy from 80-84, which included part of the hostage crisis in Iran. We not only had professors addressing those issue, but both they and the Administration would bring in various speakers, including some former hostages and others with first-hand experience there. It was pretty interesting to see the different messages coming from the various perspectives. We even had some folks from the Shah's regime -- some got it, and some just didn't understand.

Most of my contacts now are current/former military or government service.

 

[Soda]

In the meantime, to all four of you reading this thread, here are three article I published in my program's student journal. You should read them, or don't, up to you.

[url]https://gmumessa.wordpress.com/2015/04/13/humanitarian-disaster-a-story-of-syrias-barrel-bombs/[/url]

[url]https://gmumessa.wordpress.com/2015/04/04/syrias-agricultural-economy-prior-to-the-uprisings/[/url]

[url]https://gmumessa.wordpress.com/2015/03/30/a-sectarian-revolution-a-book-review-of-thomas-pierrets-religion-and-state-in-syria/[/url]

Read all 3 and also read the article about the Tsarnaev case and the testing of the justice system; it was my favorite of yours I've been thru. The illustration of the causal relationship behind Obama's drone strike habits and the continued (and perhaps increasing) unrest in the Middle East was both eye-opening and easy enough to digest. I'm also glad you didn't accuse the American way of life as the catalyst for the hatred against the US, but rather the decision makers. The casualty count is extremely upsetting, especially when you consider how much a percentage of them are, essentially, out-of-sight, out-of-mind for our leaders.

 

[gourimoko]

@The Human Q-Tip I eagerly await the rest.

In the meantime, to all four of you reading this thread, here are three article I published in my program's student journal. You should read them, or don't, up to you.

https://gmumessa.wordpress.com/2015/04/13/humanitarian-disaster-a-story-of-syrias-barrel-bombs/

https://gmumessa.wordpress.com/2015/04/04/syrias-agricultural-economy-prior-to-the-uprisings/

https://gmumessa.wordpress.com/2015...-thomas-pierrets-religion-and-state-in-syria/

Definitely looking forward to reading these today!

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

I agree -- those were well-written and informative articles.

There was one statement in the last article that kind of jumped out at me:

"Moreover, post-Arab uprisings, this type of decision could play a significant role in countries such as Egypt, where people of religion may currently fear the regime."

I didn't know quite what was meant by that. Are you saying that the regime is anti-islam, anti-Christian, or what?

 

[Jordan]

Thanks everyone!!

@Soda I'm glad you enjoyed the articles. As much as I would like to take credit for the article it was written by a colleague of mine. I will pass along to her, though, your comments.

@The Human Q-Tip I will respond to our debate later but as for my point in the article I was mainly referring to how the regime has begun jailing journalists, Imams, certain Coptic activists, etc. who pose a threat -- political or otherwise -- to Sisi.

 

[Jordan]

I'd agree that you can get data regarding part of the economic picture. But trying to draw a reliable quantitative analysis of how much they would actually support shipping weapons overseas isn't going to work. Part of that calculus is what the mullahs would decide to do in the future, and even they probably don't even know that. Heck, we don't even know what our economy is going to be like 3 years from now, nor do we know exactly how we'll respond to changing events in the future. Reliably quantifying something that depends so much on inherently political decisions that will be made in the future is impossible, and that's leaving the purely economic part out of it completely. What we do know is that even now, while under some sanctions, they're continue to support insurgencies and terrorism throughout the region. Logically, if we reduced those sanctions without any agreement to reduce terrorism, that support would increase, even if we can't quantify how much.

But that is not logically consistent. The regime has always supported terrorism regardless of sanctions. Frankly, their support increased after sanctions.

That's what happened in 2009, so at least we have actual evidence that worsening economic conditions leads to unrest.

Okay, again, the economic unrest in 2009 was caused by a global recession, not our sanctions. But, even if you are right, and our sanctions cause enough unrest to create protests and possible regime change, that means the people who take over will hate the United States more than the current clerics. That does not look like a wise choice on my end.

Where is the evidence of that? Again, the only evidence we have is what happened in 2009 -- which would be more severe now because of the oil price collapse -- and that anger was directed against the regime. In any case, what's the likelihood that if the business class succeeded the mullahs, they'd actually increase support for terrorism and thereby trigger more sanctions?

That's a strawman, though. I never said they will further fund terrorism. But if you are wondering why people would hate the United States after Washington continued to sanction the shit out of their business try to give these people some human agency. Iranians are not robots. If the clerics are overthrown, whoever is in charge won't love the United States, especially if they suffered from sanctions. That's not to say they will fund terrorism. Turkey has not historically been a huge funder of terrorism, neither have China or Russia, they still act on anti-American sentiment.

Your argument is that reducing sanctions will somehow trigger a revolution. Is there any evidence of that at all? As far as I can tell, the evidence is that Iranians may rebel if they blame the regime for worsening economic conditions. I don't think there's any evidence that Iranians will rebel when economic conditions improve. I mean, it's a theory that the Iranian business class is no doubt very eager to push, because they want the sanctions lifted. And if they have to tell gullible Americans that a rebellion is more likely if sanctions are reversed, why not? I wouldn't blame them.

My argument is that removing sanctions will provide the business class with more resources that will eventually allow them to stage a significant opposition to the regime. What you clearly are ignoring, even though I've thrown source (EIU, Vali Nasr, etc.) that present the data at you, is that sanctions have killed the business class. The business class did not like the regime before sanctions. The relationship has always been contentious. This is not a new phenomenon. But they can't make enough money to gain political power and rebel against the regime. Again though, even if that is all bullshit (it's not), if sanctions will lead to more unrest and eventual opposition/overthrow of the clerics they will have anti-american sentiments because American sanctions made their life a living hell.

Well, you said earlier that Iranians were "very happy", and that it was bad economic that times led to the GM.

So because I don't like Obama I am not allowed to be very happy living in America? I'm sorry but that is a completely idiotic statement. Iranians are very happy in Iran. The GM was a reflection of the historically contentious relations between the business class and regime being magnified from bad economic times.

Again, I'm failing to see how this supports the idea that better economic times will trigger a revolution. In all honesty, that seems like a very self-serving theory being advanced by Iranian businessmen eager to make more money.

I think a brief understanding of democratic theory is therefore necessary. People's voices are heard because they have money. This is the same in dictatorships and democracies. If people don't have money, their voices are drowned out. What is occurring in Iran is a drowning out of the business class's voice. For example, it was their voice that allowed for Rafsanjani to be elected president. While no western moderate, he did challenge the clerics more than any president in Iranian history.

Iran really doesn't have to worry about a neighbor providing safe haven for enemy troops in a civil war -- the only neighbors who'd like to see the mullahs go would be too afraid of triggering Iranian military attacks on their own country. So, since "outside" forces aren't available, the key to a successful revolution in Iran is the loyalty of the military and basij. If you had enough anger among the populace to overwhelm the basij, and the military wouldn't shoot at its own people, it might work. But I just don't see how you're going to get such huge numbers of people to risk their lives in street battles during good economic times.

Okay, so you are saying by purposefully weakening Iran's economy people will protest against the regime and then, after they overthrow, will be moderate and pro-United States? They would be so thankful that we made their life a living hell?

Just as an initial point, Egypt or any other nation sucking does not make Iran's leadership one iota better, and doesn't make Iran any better as a potential partner for peace. It's support of terrorism and destabilization dwarfs that of anyone else in the region. They're the primary supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah, which essentially make any peace with Israel impossible.. Iran's support for radical Shi'ite militias in Iraq was probably the single biggest factor in fomenting civil war. Senior U.S. military personnel have attributed one-third of U.S. casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq to Iranian proxies. Iran also has boots on the ground in Syria and Yemen.

I agree with all of that.

As an aside, we didn't put Sisi in place, and when there was a rebellion against Mubarak, U.S. pressure was a major element in the Egyptian military not cracking down. Nor did we engineer a coup against Morsi -- Egypt's military did that.

No, but the U.S. State Department was presented with a situation to call it a coup, which would have resulted in the temporary removal of all aid. That would have put a check on the dictatorial actions we are seeing today. Rather, it showed Sisi that Washington would support him regardless of what his actions were.

But, I'll point out that the Muslim Brotherhood that replaced Mubarak was no better, and worse in some respects. As King Abdullah of Jordan stated, the MB were "wolves in sheeps' clothing." So yeah, Sisi sucks. I'd still rather he be running Egypt that the mullahs be running Iran, because at least Egypt is interested in regional peace. Iran isn't.

That is patently false. Like, laughably incorrect. Have you read what Sisi is doing to his population? ANYONE who has an opposition to him is being jailed. There are reports saying he has overtaken Assad in number of torture chambers. Morsi was no saint, do not get me wrong, but Sisi is worse than Mubarak.

Yes, though the government cut off support awhile back and is now cooperating with efforts against them. But, the whole reason for that support in the first place was the relentless Iranian support of radical Shi'ite groups in Iraq, and of its proxies like Syria. The Saudi support to the predecessors of ISIS was to combat Iran, which is why Iranian meddling is so destructive to regional stability. As I'm sure you know, the Arab states of the ME generally don't want the non-Arab Iranians messing with their countries.

Unfortunately, I think you are viewing things in sectarian lenses way more than is necessary. Saudi opposition to Iranian groups and vice-versa stem back to the Arab Cold War in the 60s-80s. Neither one triggered the other's support of terrorists. They are both equally bad.

I've got no problem with pressuring Egypt to have more respect for human rights. I just don't see what that has to do with Iran.

I stated previously that this was part of a broader debate regarding stability vs. humanitarian ideals in U.S. foreign policy. In my belief, Washington needs a broader respect for human rights over stability. This leads to my opposition to the Iran deal because it still allows them to support the Syrian and Yemeni civil war.

Just to be clear, you're talking about Iran replacing Israel and Saudi Arabia as a positive force in the region? Because that's the line the Administration has leaked, and it is utterly divorced from reality.

No, that's not what I said. Do I think Israel is probably a better ally than Iran? Yeah, most likely. But that won't last if they continue to oppress their populations! Are their actions worse than Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Syria? Not in my opinion. But if you talk to Arabs they say that Israel is the only policy they have some level of control over and that is why they direct their anger towards Tel Aviv.

Now, I do think Iran could be a better ally than Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia continuously pays money to create and distribute wahhabi textbooks and wahhabi-oriented madrases across the region. These are the primary recruiting places for groups like ISIS and AQ.

I didn't say you did. I was asking whether you advocated that the U.S. provide support in the form of weapons, etc. to this group of nascent rebels/businessmen in Iran -- not committing U.S. military forces directly.

Not now, but I think the U.S. could have taken a much, much harder line in 2009.

It's interesting for me to see what some in academia are saying now as well. Undergrad was a very long time ago for me, but it was noteworthy because I was in a military academy from 80-84, which included part of the hostage crisis in Iran. We not only had professors addressing those issue, but both they and the Administration would bring in various speakers, including some former hostages and others with first-hand experience there. It was pretty interesting to see the different messages coming from the various perspectives. We even had some folks from the Shah's regime -- some got it, and some just didn't understand.

Most of my contacts now are current/former military or government service.

Yeah, I hope you are not taking my comments to be disrespectful. I really do respect your thoughts and ideas and am enjoying the discussion.

 

[Sebastian]

Guys, Iraq is spelled with a 'Q,' not an 'R.'

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

But that is not logically consistent. The regime has always supported terrorism regardless of sanctions. Frankly, their support increased after sanctions.

You just made the point upthread that Iran wanted relief from sanctions so that it could purchase weapons.

Okay, again, the economic unrest in 2009 was caused by a global recession, not our sanctions. But, even if you are right, and our sanctions cause enough unrest to create protests and possible regime change, that means the people who take over will hate the United States more than the current clerics. That does not look like a wise choice on my end....

....But if you are wondering why people would hate the United States after Washington continued to sanction the shit out of their business try to give these people some human agency. Iranians are not robots. If the clerics are overthrown, whoever is in charge won't love the United States, especially if they suffered from sanctions. That's not to say they will fund terrorism. Turkey has not historically been a huge funder of terrorism, neither have China or Russia, they still act on anti-American sentiment.

First, the purpose of sanctions isn't to give Iranians "human agency", but to avoid helping the regime finance terrorism. Sanctions would have a much greater effect now than they did before because of the collapse of oil prices.

Second, I think it is perfectly moral/justifiable to refuse to do business with a regime that sponsors terrorism. If that pisses off some Iranians, well, too bad. It's their nation that is engaging in that conduct. We should make it clear that we have no quarrel with the Iranian people, but will impose harsh sanctions as long as that regime funds terrorism. If that stops, so will the sanctions. If that nevertheless pisses people off against us, too bad.

So third, whether they hate us for imposing sanctions isn't all that important as long as they don't export violence against us, and to other countries, which you agree they probably wouldn't. And if one of the major goals of these revolutionaries is to get all sanctions lifted, it seems extremely unlikely they'd bother overthrowing a regime only to take actions that would prevent the lifting of sanctions.

My argument is that removing sanctions will provide the business class with more resources that will eventually allow them to stage a significant opposition to the regime. What you clearly are ignoring, even though I've thrown source (EIU, Vali Nasr, etc.) that present the data at you, is that sanctions have killed the business class. The business class did not like the regime before sanctions. The relationship has always been contentious. This is not a new phenomenon. But they can't make enough money to gain political power and rebel against the regime.

It seems to me you are making an extraordinary leap by saying that Iranian businessmen who manage to get sanctions lifted, and so have their businesses boom, are going to toss all that newfound economic prosperity away by throwing down with the basij and Revolutionary Guard. Why would they do that? I'd grant you that those businessmen still wouldn't like everything about the regime, but a civil war places everything they've earned at even greater risk.

You keep pushing the theory of linkage between increased wealth and revolution, but there is absolutely no actual evidence of that. The didn't rebel prior to the 2009 downturn, when things were good, the same regime was in place, and they were doing well economically. They only rebelled after.

So because I don't like Obama I am not allowed to be very happy living in America? I'm sorry but that is a completely idiotic statement. Iranians are very happy in Iran.

I don't understand your point. I'm talking about the conditions necessary to trigger a revolution. I'm not 'happy' with Obama either, but us otherwise very happy Americans also aren't being expected to start a revolution. Nor would we -- it takes more than not liking your leadership for a revolution. It usually takes being very pissed off and unhappy.

Yet, starting a revolution is exactly what you're asking/expecting of a bunch of otherwise "very happy" Iranians who would be finding themselves even happier because sanctions would be lifted, and business booming.

I'm not sure how else to say it other than "very happy" people generally don't toss everything away to start a violent revolution against an entrenched dictatorship.

The GM was a reflection of the historically contentious relations between the business class and regime being magnified from bad economic times.

Seriously, please reread what you just wrote and consider the implication. If bad economic times magnified those "historically contentious relations", then wouldn't the better economic times that come from a lifting of sanctions reduce that contentiousness? Improving economic conditions generally don't trigger revolutions.

Okay, so you are saying by purposefully weakening Iran's economy people will protest against the regime and then, after they overthrow, will be moderate and pro-United States? They would be so thankful that we made their life a living hell?

Well, do they hate us now?

Because sanctions have been in place since the embassy fell more than 35 years, so if your point is correct, their hatred of Americans should already be boundless. But if not, then I'd suggest the idea that sanctions against the regime cause average Iranians to hate us is mistaken.

And just to be clear, I'm sure there are expatriate Iraqis, members of the Iraqi business class, and/or people sympathetic to either, who use the argument that "sanctions will make Iranians hate the U.S.")in an effort to convince us to lift sanctions. But that's a completely self-serving argument given that they want sanctions lifted for their own sake. They tell us what they think will get us to do what they want.

But again, as long as Iran isn't exporting terrorism to us and other nations, I don't care if they like us or not.

That is patently false. Like, laughably incorrect. Have you read what Sisi is doing to his population? ANYONE who has an opposition to him is being jailed. There are reports saying he has overtaken Assad in number of torture chambers. Morsi was no saint, do not get me wrong, but Sisi is worse than Mubarak.

Sisi may be worse than Mubarak, but he is less of a danger to the nations around him than was Morsi, under whom the treatment of religious minorities was rapidly worsening. He was removed before it got even worse.

Unfortunately, I think you are viewing things in sectarian lenses way more than is necessary. Saudi opposition to Iranian groups and vice-versa stem back to the Arab Cold War in the 60s-80s. Neither one triggered the other's support of terrorists. They are both equally bad.

I don't agree, nor do I believe there are many in the military or intelligence community who believe that the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia are equally bad. The Saudis exiled OBL, if you recall. They've engaged in gun battles with radicals in their own country. And as I said upthread, one consideration in evaluating a regime is who would replace it. In Saudi Arabia, the primary opposition are highly radical Islamic extremists. In Iran, the primary opposition are those who oppose Islamic extremism. That tells you something about what we'd get if those respective government fell.

I stated previously that this was part of a broader debate regarding stability vs. humanitarian ideals in U.S. foreign policy. In my belief, Washington needs a broader respect for human rights over stability. This leads to my opposition to the Iran deal because it still allows them to support the Syrian and Yemeni civil war.

The problem is that getting rid of a regime that does not respect human rights does not mean that what replaces it will be any better. It may well be worse, so simply pointing to imperfect allies doesn't address the tougher questions. Additionally, there is a major risk that withdrawn U.S. support would be replaced by support from a nation that cares much less about human rights, like China.

No, that's not what I said. Do I think Israel is probably a better ally than Iran? Yeah, most likely. But that won't last if they continue to oppress their populations!

Well, they've lasted for 65 years, perhaps because they don't oppress their populations nearly as much as do most of their neighbors in the region.

Now, I do think Iran could be a better ally than Saudi Arabia.....

Iran has come flat-out and said that it is not going to change its behaviors, and that it has a fundamentally different view of that region than we do. When some insisted that Iran recognize Israel's right to exist, the President responded by saying that was impossible because Iran was not going to "fundamentally transform".

That contradiction is just amazing to me. On the one hand, the Administration apparently holds out this hope that Iran will fundamentally transform (because that what it would take) and become a regional partner for peace. But then the President himself comes out and flatly admits that we can't expect Iran to fundamentally transform.

Yeah, I hope you are not taking my comments to be disrespectful. I really do respect your thoughts and ideas and am enjoying the discussion.

Oh hell no. This is just discussion.

By the way, I'm curious if you've studied the arms for hostages deal Reagan ended up cutting with Iran. Though some of the stuff we sold them didn't work, it was still a bad deal. And it was based on what turned out to be a very naïve U.S. belief that doing deals with Iran would somehow strengthen moderates within the nation. Turns out it was just a scam their leadership ran -- successfully -- against ours, so that they could get stuff from us they really wanted.