As each Cavalier contract is up the question always is: What are they worth? RealCavsFans has developed a methodology over the years to project contracts based on comparable players and their deals on the open market. Next up: Keon Ellis
Previous Years
Evaluating a new Caris LeVert contract
Evaluating a new Ty Jerome contract
Evaluating a new Sam Merrill contract
Evaluating a new Isaac Okoro contract
Evaluating a new Dean Wade contract
Head coach Kenny Atkinson really wasn’t lying when he called Keon Ellis a “unique player”.
Projecting a player’s value in free agency is predicated on finding similar profiles and comparing the contract they received on the open market. The struggle with Ellis, to Kenny’s point, is he’s such a unique player it makes it hard to find comparable players to use as a baseline to find his true value.
Ellis has a rare and very specific archetype – low-usage, hyper-efficient 3&D guard who doesn’t get to the line, doesn’t create and contributes most of his value defensively through event creations (or stocks).
He has the profile of the 3&D wings that get paid but doesn’t have the size to scale up in lineups or provide the positional and schematic versatility front offices are seeking out of their hybrid guards/wings. He has the size of a guard but doesn’t have the shot creation, either for himself (12.7% USG%, 18.1% FTr) or others (8% AST%), that usually comes with players of his size. It’s like someone put a pitbull in a wiener dog’s body.
This puts Ellis in an awkward spot. Teams will pay for size + defense + shooting but Ellis doesn’t really have the size. Teams will pay for shot creation + defense + shooting but he doesn’t really have the shot creation.
The difficulty in trying to pin down Ellis and place him is not new… it’s sort of defined his career thus far.
Ethan Sands of Cleveland.com had a fantastic profile on Ellis from earlier in the year and it profiles his journey from high school to JUCO to college to undrafted to two-way to a standard contract to now looking to get paid.
Ellis transferred into Alabama from JUCO and played right away. Then, he took a leap his second year starting all 33 games and putting up 43.9/36.6/88.1 shooting splits while posting a 3.4% steal rate. It wasn’t enough to get him drafted but it was enough to get him noticed. He signed a two-way deal after being a UDFA and slowly worked his way up the Kings hierarchy not dissimilar to the way that Sam Merrill or Dean Wade did for the Cavs.
His pathway in Sacramento was not dissimilar to his pathway in college. In starting from the bottom, he earned his way onto a two-way, played some his first year but then really broke out his second year and solidifying his presence in his third year. He posted 8.3 points, 2.7 rebounds and 1.5 assists on 48.9/43.3/84.8 splits with a 3% STL%, 3% BLK% and +2 DBPM which showcased his role player-esque role of 3&D that attracted suitors from around the league this past deadline.
But, a coaching change, and a rudderless Kings franchise, proved to be a challenge as head coach Doug Christie didn’t place the same type of value on Ellis as former head coach, and now Finals head coach, Mike Brown did.
(Side note: You can see the way Brown valued Delonte West when he was in Cleveland, Matthew Delevadova the second time he was in Cleveland, Steve Blake while in Los Angeles, now Landry Shamet in New York, and see how he saw value in Ellis while in Sacramento).
In true Kings fashion, to get off a contract they prioritized during the offseason (Dennis Schroder) they used one of their better, younger assets they had in order to do it. They did receive De’Andre Hunter in return, but it made little sense in what the Kings were doing but since when did anything they do make sense?
Ellis saw minutes right away in Cleveland and even started 6 games but in a similar fashion as he saw in Sacramento the minutes halted even after averaging 26.8 minutes in 15 March games leading into the playoffs. Ellis appeared in 12 playoff games playing in just 89 minutes with many of them coming in mop-up time rather than crunch time.
So where does that leave Ellis? Well, it depends.
Right now, the Cavs have some sorting out to do. They paid $47.4M to Max Strus, Dennis Schroder, Sam Merrill, Dean Wade and Keon Ellis, and didn’t get the type of production they had hoped for during the postseason (36.2% 3P% on 15.5 3PA/g, and a -89) with a group that will only get more expensive as all of the players will see raises with Wade and Ellis figuring in most substantially as they hit the open market.
Even with a James Harden discount pending (say it starts at $30M for next year, down from $42.3M), the Cavs top half of their roster with Donovan Mitchell, Evan Mobley and Jarrett Allen will account for $158M of a $165M salary cap. The Cavs were a 2nd Apron team last year and may try to avoid the 2nd Apron this offseason, which means they have $64M (2nd Apron is $222M) to fill out 10 roster spots around those four players. Translation: They can’t keep everyone and will have to let someone walk. Wade and Ellis are the most natural answers since it doesn’t cost anything to let them walk, whereas it may cost something to move off Strus and/or Schroder (just like it cost the Kings), but the Cavs may also be losing on talent swap in doing so.
Throughout his tenure as decision maker in Cleveland, President of Basketball Operations Koby Altman has been persistent in acquiring targets and being patient for guys when the opportunity presents itself. Ellis is one of those guys so it would be a bit odd to see the Cavs prioritize Ellis in a deal, be the crown jewel of a Hunter deal (to which it cost them so much to get Hunter), only for them to let Ellis walk for nothing.
To start: It helps when as a role player, you’re a positive with the four best players. After Merrill, Ellis’s top 5 2-man pairings during the regular season came with the core four.
The Cavs were hoping they were getting a better fitting Isaac Okoro, and they kinda did and kinda didn’t.
Okoro was a stout defender, and an improved shot maker, but didn’t shoot at the volume they needed (despite 37% 3P% over his last four years as a Cav) and didn’t do enough other things (career 5.9% REB%, under 3% stock%, only a 13.2% USG% and 8.3% AST%). His value was derived from playing strong individual defense and sometimes hitting enough 3’s, but that’s about it.
The Cavs thought they were getting that defense but with a possession plus player with added shooting. Ellis came to Cleveland shooting 40.7% 3P% on 6 3PA per 36 but hit just 35.5% on 5.3 3PA per 36 (or Okoro-lite numbers). Ellis added defensive play creation with a 5.7% stock% but isn’t a strong rebounder (career 6% REB%) and isn’t a strong offensive play creator (career 8.2% AST%, and 12.7% USG%).
So here we stand in a similar position the Cavs were in after the Cavs thought they were improving their position. Koby gave Okoro a 3-year, $33M extension and then traded him away; we’ll see how Koby values a similar profile of player the second time around.
Where Ellis’s value really lives is in his ability to create disruption defensively, create extra opportunities defensively and limit his mistakes offensively. We’ve seen a shift in valuing role players that can suppress their mistakes offensively while increase opportunities defensively, and Ellis very much fits into this category.
The stocks are good but the challenge is sometimes they come at the expense of your possession-to-possession breakdowns that can be just as disruptive to a defense as his plays defensively are disruptive to an offense. The mantra live by the sword and die by the sword for Ellis is probably an apt description. Ellis is a very active defender that collects contests, deflections, box score stats but on-ball Bball Index placed him in 71st percentile in perimeter isolation defense – a very solid score but much less a stopper and more so a respectable level defender.
The Cavs acquired Ellis in part to help resolve their point of attack issues defensively but were met with two challenges: 1). Ellis may be better off-ball and in seeking opportunities than he is in on-ball and seeking matchups, and 2). The size overlap the Hunter traded created forced Ellis to play up more often which is not who he is.
Ellis’s value was less realized because the roster construction needed more out of Ellis in guarding bigger, longer, stronger players because of the high minute distribution amongst Harden and Mitchell followed by Merrill being the first guard off the bench with Schroder also getting play because of Kenny valuing, and the team kind of needing, additional playmaking they weren’t getting from other spots.
That left Ellis doing more of things that were maybe outside of his frame and fit which is a common theme amongst the Cavs role players this year. The Cavs were 28th percentile in on/off in points per possession defensively, as opposed to in the 61-78th percentile range while he was with the Kings, which may speak to the positional issues Ellis had defensively.
Ellis offensively has been covered to an extent – he’s a low mistake, but also low usage player, who sees most of his value offensively derived from his shot which is why shooting 35.5% from 3 after coming over at the trade deadline was so detrimental to his offensive value.
But a few notes on Ellis offensively worth noting…
Despite limited attempts and limited frequency his short mid and rim accuracy are very good for someone who primarily sticks to the perimeter. 85.2% and 79.4% at the rim the last two years and 43.6%, 51.7% and 68.4% in the short mid-range the last three years. Those are all workable numbers and something to be leveraged to increase his ways to impact a game offensively if more situations can be designed for him inside the paint.
There’s also a bit more to Ellis’s offensive game the maybe that’s been credited to him for or afforded him by coaching staffs. A late season game against the Grizzlies isn’t the best example but it points to some untapped things Ellis can do in spurts. There’s also some underlying data, albeit in small sample sizes, that point to some growth areas for Ellis.
66 career possessions in the handoff playtype but 70th percentile in points per possession. 24 career possessions on cuts but 77th percentile in PPP. 109 possessions in handler playtypes but 63rd percentile in PPP. Spot-up and transition account for the lion’s share of Ellis’s offensive usage but the video example and the data show a player that may have more in him if the provided the opportunity. If so, it could diversify his skillset offensively that would allow his offensive game not to be so perimeter shot dependent and provide an avenue to a contract that ages better than anticipated.
Finding a player to fit this narrow lens of a player was hard. Ironically, a former Cavalier might be the best example of what Ellis could be but was already well established (250+ starts with another 60+ playoff starts) by the time he signed his deal at age 28 that averaged 11% of the cap. Even when he signed his deal at 25, he started 38 games for the Spurs and looked very much like the quintessential 3&D player the league coveted and the Spurs perfected. That player is Danny Green.
Green, like Ellis, was three-point marksmen converting 41.8% of his 3’s on a 49.9% three-point rate, and like Ellis, put together a combined 4.1% stock rate with STL% and BLK% both being above 2%. Not a great rebounder (8.7% REB%) not someone who was going to flash as a passer (7.9% AST%, 11.4 TOV%) didn’t get to the line a bunch (19.2% FTr) but was able to do little bit more with the ball in his hands (+5.1% USG% differential at similar point of their careers). Still, the match is there.
Outside of Green, it was much harder to fit secondary fits. Guys like Josh Hart, Royce O’Neale, De’Anthony Melton and Josh Richardson hovered around as ancillary fits. But Hart rebounded better and didn’t hit threes like Ellis. O’Neale had similar shooting splits, especially on 2’s, but was a bit better passer, rebounder and didn’t have quite the stock creation like Ellis. Melton was much better with the ball in his hands but flashed similarly high-level defensive event creation and could shoot it. Similar story for Richardson.
The next best fit for Ellis is a lot like Ellis and a possibly caution story for how to value defensive event creation over defensive ability and limited offensive value outside of a shot – Matisse Thybulle. There was a time when Thybulle was thought of as a high-level stopper and entered the league as such. At a similar age, Thybulle even outpaced Ellis’s stock production but had a very similar profile – didn’t rebound at all (5.4% REB%), didn’t do much with the ball in his hands (10.10 AST%, 6.6 AST%), didn’t get to the line (12.3% FTr) and relied heavily on his shot (55.8 3Par, 33.4% 3P%) which ended up failing him and hurting his playability. Thybulle ended up getting a healthy deal (3/33), but his contract quickly turned sour once his value was siloed to stock creation without the true offensive and defensive impact the Blazers were hoping for.
The 14 player comps found for Ellis were within the 25-27 age range – any younger than 25 (Ellis will be 26 to begin his deal) and there’s an upside play involved. Any older than 27 and there’s an age concern involved. 25-27 is the sweet spot where teams feel pretty confident in who they’re paying, and they’ll get the most out of it and it shows in 2.875 being the average length of a deal and only two one-year deals in the group with most being 3-to-4-year deals.
The average annual value of a deal was $8M which doesn’t factor in AAV relative to the cap which came out to 7.98% (or ~$13.1M in 2026-2027). The one thing that’s apparent is for the wide variety of player outcomes and abilities on the list, the open market tends to overvalue these types of players. Teams like 3&Dness and are willing to bet on them especially when they’re entering their prime.
Compared to other deals we’ve projected, Ellis is the least confident I feel in this being his actual number. His value likely took a hit after not being the same in Cleveland as he was in Sacramento and not really seeing the floor in the playoffs. Also, any time a shot dips down like it did for Ellis when so much of his profile is built around it gives teams some pause. But, hearing how valued he was at the deadline, some team is likely going to still hold their belief in Ellis and think he got put into a bad situation.
While $13.1M in Year 1 feels a bit rich for Ellis it would be slightly below the full $15M non-taxpayer midlevel exception… which wouldn’t be the craziest thing but would be a bit surprising. Schroder, Caris LeVert, Dorian Finney-Smith and Davion Mitchell all got similar amounts in 2025 which makes it seem more likely.
Given Thybulle (7.67%) and Green (6.27%) were Ellis’s closest comps, the 6% or 7% range seems a bit safer projection for Ellis. On a three-year deal that would look like $10.4M AAV for $31.2M total on a 6% of the cap deal (with 5% raises) or $12.1M AAV for $36.4M total on a 7% of the cap deal (with 5% raises).
The Cavs gave Merrill a four-year deal at age 29 at $9.5M AAV (or about 5.6% of the cap over the course of the deal) just last year and it would be fair to say the Cavs would likely want to stay within that same structure for Ellis if he returns.
There was a recent report that said the Cavs may prioritize resigning Wade over Ellis this offseason. In a vacuum, it makes sense as the Cavs lack playable size and Wade helps more in that case where there’s too much size overlap with Merrill and Schroder, and it may be hard to move Schroder (unless they stretch and waive) but the Cavs may have to circle back to Ellis more seriously if/when Wade’s market is more robust then the Cavs may be willing to engage with.
Which would be fitting and full circle for Ellis. Overlooked, and given another chance, and teams have typically been on the right side in year two of Ellis. We’ll see if the Cavs pay to find out.
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