The 2026 offseason was set to be the pivot point -- Donovan Mitchell’s player option would be a year away; Jarrett Allen’s three-year extension would kick in and his salary would jump to $28M; Darius Garland would be extension eligible; it might have been the first year in the 2nd Apron which starts the draft pick penalty clock; and the Cavs would be coming off a fourth playoff run with the core four confirming its stature as boom or bust. From there, the Cavs and Mitchell would assess his future –stay on a longer-term deal or find a new home, one that could better position him for playoff success? After, the decision tree would flow.
Apparently, Mitchell didn’t want to wait until the offseason and bumped up that pivot point to now.
There’s a confluence of factors leading to a 26-year-old Garland being moved mid-season for a 36-year-old James Harden but at the heart of them are this:
- Mitchell wants to win now, not the offseason, now
- The East is wide open – no Jayson Tatum, no Tyrese Haliburton, and the #1 seed Detroit Pistons needing to prove their regular season success as worthwhile
- Garland sustaining not one but two separate toe injuries – one reinjury, one new one
- The decision makers preferring Harden’s offensive variance over Garland’s offensive variance over the next 30 games plus 16
Moving Garland for Harden signifies they didn’t think it was. Or they didn’t want to bet Mitchell’s future on Garland’s toe(s).
Harden makes the Cavs better this year… I think. Let me rephrase that: Harden is in a better spot physically than Garden is right now and therefore may be in a better spot to help Mitchell and Evan Mobley (we’ll see) compete for the Eastern crown. Can I guarantee that? No.
Let’s be honest: If it walks like a duck and it talks like a duck then it probably is a duck.
Harden is now 4-for-4 in asking for trades from teams over the last 6 years and has proven a willingness to up-and-leave at a whim. Harden is every bit a flight risk that Garland is an injury risk.
Harden’s will be more available (slightly). Harden has played in 84.4% of his games over the last 5 season compared to Garland playing in 77.8%. Availability for Garland has been part of the issue but effectiveness when not 100% has been the bigger issue.
Garland is one of the shiftiest, quickest guards in the league and can zap from arc to restricted area within a few dribbles, and his darting around P&R screens navigating into the short mid-range will be missed. But all that changes when he’s not right. Garland is like a Porsche that without fine tuning, it doesn’t run right. And when you get to the playoffs, no car is finely tuned and must run on what it’s got. For Garland, a player that relies on his lower body accel/decel and shiftiness to overcome his lack of size and other not-so-elite physical attributes, it impacts him more than others. And this concern is not only true for this transaction but would have been true during extension discussions.
The Cavs weren’t willing to live through that again knowing what was at stake. Instead, they took a chance on someone who is likely to be more available but can be just as likely to disappear.
2025 Game 7 vs Denver, Harden has 13 assists but goes 2-8 with 7 points and Clippers lose. 2024 Game 5 vs Dallas, Harden has 7 assists, and 7 points on 2-12 shooting. Game 6 vs Dallas, Harden has 13 assists but 16 points on 5-16 shooting. The Clippers lose both games. 2023 Game 7 vs Boston as Jayson Tatum goes for 51 points as Harden musters 9 points on 3-11 shooting and 4 assists. That series Game 6, Harden again goes 4-for-16 with 13 points and 9 assists with 5 turnovers. Philly loses both games. 2022 Game 6 vs Miami, Harden has 14 points on 5-13 shooting with 4 assists and 4 turnovers. Game 7 vs Miami, Harden with 11 points on 4-9 shooting and 9 assists to 4 turnovers. Philly loses both games. The list goes on.
The predictability in Harden being available is one thing but the predictability in knowing which Harden will show up is another thing.
Mitchell being okay with Garland being moved signals there wasn’t a trust Garland would show up when Mitchell needed it, and Harden might. If Mitchell trusted Garland in the playoffs, or trusted him to get right for the playoffs, he would still be here.
It’s a bittersweet end for Garland in Cleveland. The dual playmaker role was supposed to work and persist for years to come. He was drafted here. Developed here. Helped bring the Cavs back to relevance before Mitchell (and set them up to secure Mitchell). And has had healthy seasons only to be derailed by chance injuries at the most inopportune times. Garland is one of the leagues more creative, and effective creators and shot makers… when healthy. To no fault of his own, the latter is what soured the spot the Cavs were in with Garland and forced them to consider alternatives.
For as long as Mitchell has been here, the Cavs were straddling two timelines – the Garland, Mobley and Allen timeline and the Mitchell timeline. The goal was for Garland, Mobley and Allen to develop quickly enough to meet Mitchell at his timeline. The Cavs skipped a step or two in throwing Mitchell into the mix and decided they were out of time to see if they could make the final ascent. Instead, President of Basketball Operations Koby Altman has sent a clear message: We’re squarely on Mitchell’s timeline now.
Finances
This was not a money saving move this was a money reallocation move – the Cavs rather pay Harden over the next 2 to 3 years over Garland.
Harden’s 2025-2026 salary was within a few hundred thousand dollars of Garland which made it legal, as the Cavs were taking back less salary than they sent out, but ineffective at cost savings. The Cavs may end up saving a small amount but nothing of any significance to make a dent in their $13.8M they sit over the 2nd Apron at.
While Harden had a trade kicker, a bonus eligible for a player to receive upon being traded, he waived the kicker to accommodate the deal. Otherwise, the Cavs would have had to climb the 2nd Apron mountain to move off enough salary to get a deal done to afford Harden’s trade bonus.
The 2026-2027 salary is a player option with a partial guarantee already locked in. The Cavs went into this trade likely knowing the answer to one of these options:
- Decline his option and walks. His $13.5M partial guarantee for 26-27 stays on the books.
- Decline his option and re-sign. Harden wanted the Clippers to trade him due to not getting a 2-year, $40M AAV extension. By agreeing to the trade, he lost his Bird Rights, but the Cavs could re-sign him with Non-Bird Rights – year one is up to 120% of his prior-year salary ($39.1M) for up to 4 years with 5% annual raises. They could give Harden the 2-year deal he wants and do so without needing cap space or a signing exception. This would align with Mitchell’s two more years (if he picks up his player option for 2027-2028) much the same way Harden and Leonard aligned their deals in Los Angeles.
- Pick up his player option and walks. Harden would earn $42.3M next year (same as Garland). If the Cavs and Harden want an extended look before they commit longer-term this could be an option and provide an escape route for both the Cavs before committing to a 38-year-old Harden and allows Harden to adhere to whichever way the wind takes him after next year.
- Pick up his player option and then re-signs. Do the Cavs want to commit to Harden until age 39 or 40? Waiting would give the flexibility to see what Mitchell elects to do with his player option before re-signing but it also may mean losing out on an extra year of security he rather have up front. Is a team more likely to commit $30M, $35M or $40M AAV to him this offseason or after next offseason?
Harden doesn’t want an extension, request a trade after not getting an extension, accept the trade (which he had the right to reject) and waive his trade kicker (and give up bonus money) to not get what he wanted which was an extension. Shams Charania said Harden “wants to be somewhere he will be for multiple years,” and Brian Windhorst said, “he gets paid whether it’s just guaranteeing year’s salary or whether he gets a wink-wink understanding of more in the future.”
The question with Harden is will he end with the team that he signed the contract with.
The cost savings come if they eject early on the arrangement otherwise there are no real cost savings with this move. Unless, the cost savings are avoiding an extension with Garland, which he was eligible for this year, and paying him at age 29 at an average of $60M to $70M per year over a four- or five-year deal. That may have been untenable based on faith in Garland but also in being unable to pay Mitchell (on a new deal), Mobley and Garland all max level deals, and choosing which two they want to build around.
Assets
At the conclusion of the deal, the Cavs have just two future 2nd Round picks left – 2028 and 2032. That means over the next two drafts, the Cavs will only have one total pick. This is an all-in move to exhaust draft equity as much as it is a bet on their player development system to continually churn out another Sam Merrill or Nae’Qwan Tomlin.
This is important in two ways:
- 2nd Apron teams cannot buy draft picks, and 1st Apron teams become hard capped at the 2nd Apron if they buy a draft pick.
- 2nds are often ways to get deals across the finish line (i.e. De’Andre Hutner deal and now this one). So, without them, needed extra touches become harder.
Fit
Let’s talk hoops.
Harden is a ball-handler in every sense of the word. He spends 42% of his time on the ball, is 14th in touches per game (Mitchell is 18th), 2nd in time of possession, 1st in average seconds per touch and 2nd in average dribbles per touch. These are Jalen Brunson, Shai Gilgeous-Alexander levels of usage and time spent with the ball in his hands.
Compare that to Garland – 32% of his time on the ball this year, about 9 less touches per game, a full 1.5 seconds less per touch on average and at least 1 less dribble per touch. Garland’s on-ball numbers used to be like Harden’s pre-Mitchell but slowly trended down as his partnership went on. The goal is to get Mitchell off the ball more, and he may oblige to get some rest, as his usage is the highest it’s been since he’s been in Cleveland (33.4%).
This also shows up in the biggest difference between Harden and Garland in their playtypes – both operate in P&R ball-handling a fair amount but Harden leads the league (by almost 14%!) in frequency of plays spent in isolation at 42.1%; Garland is at a mere 6.7%. Harden is efficient in those settings with a rPPP of +0.13 but how Harden uses possessions and handles the ball is a drastic shift from Garland and for the team.
Also bringing in Dennis Schroder provides yet another ball-handler who likes to have the ball in his hands. For a coach like Kenny Atkinson who stresses player and ball movement, there may be an adjustment period for both sides as they figure out to meld two very conflicting styles of play.
Going from Garland to Harden, the Cavs are still getting someone who generates ample looks for teammates – 26.9 potential assist points per 100, 18.5 potential assists per 100, 4.5 at rim assists per 100 and 4.1 three-point assists per 100. Those numbers are all near identical to Garland’s.
One area that Harden can bring back, that seems to have been lost with these current set of guards is vertical spacing with the bigs. Harden’s signature pass might be the on-the-run-lob off one hand to a rolling big. Clint Capela made a living in Houston off it much the same way Mobley and/or Allen can in their P&R opportunities with him.
Where they diverge a good amount is how they handle drives. Garland uses drives to create opportunities for others while Harden uses drives to create for himself.
Despite the toe issues, Garland was working his way up the drive list and was 13th as of the trade; Harden was 8th. Both players spend a tremendous amount of their time inside the paint but Harden’s split paint a different picture – 65.4% pts% (how often a player scores on a drive) 34.6 pass% (how often a player passes on a drive), 10.2 ast%, 5.7% tov% and a 11.8 personal foul%. With Garland, he posted 44.9 pts%, a 48.6 pass%, a 13.8% ast%, 6.2% tov%, and a 4.5% personal foul%.
Harden’s 11.8 personal foul% is a notch below Luka Doncic and within the same realm as Zion Williamson. Harden’s drives in the paint cause stress in different ways than Garland where his intent is to punish teams through getting points and getting to the line.
This shift in how the two play will provide the Cavaliers offense a higher floor but the Cavs drive, kick, swing game that Atkinson preaches and may impact how pick-and-rolls are handled with the bigs as being more decoys and shifting to getting bodies off Harden then rolling for shot attempts.
As games slowdown in the playoffs, windows tighten and points become harder to score, trips to the free-throw line can be a demoralizing place to be for an opposing defense. While Harden isn’t the prime Harden of double-digit FTAs per 36 his 8.6 FTA per 36 would still lead the team (and be a shade under Mitchell) – that figure is nearly double Garland’s.
The Cavs were often dependent on kick out games with their shooters, or individual creation and it at time limited their outputs to either hot shooting performances or hero ball. Harden brings another way to score that isn’t really seen anywhere else on the roster.
Harden’s rTS% (relative TS% to league average) is +2.6 (80th percentile) that shows his extreme efficiency compared to the rest of the league but the TS% is buoyed by a 100th percentile free-throw rate and 94th percentile FT%. Take that away, and his 2P% is 3% lower than Garland’s and his 3P% 1.3% lower.
Harden and Garland’s shot locations aren’t all too drastic, Harden is just simply a better finisher this year. While Garland prefers to do his damage in the short mid, Harden’s 66.4% FG% at the rim would be a career high. However, his 38.9% short-mid FG% and 35.8% long-mid FG% are near or at career lows and have been trending the wrong way for the last few years.
The two other areas to hit on offensively are two of note that often frustrated fans with Garland’s performance – clutch time and playoffs.
There’s an interesting dichotomy here. On one hand, Garland’s performance in both areas is lackluster -- his adjusted rTS% in the playoffs for his career is -2.9% and has a raw oRTG of 105.5. His clutch rEFG% over the last three years is -3% (so eFG% is 3% worse than relative eFG%) despite taking 13.2% of the team’s clutch shots.
On the other hand, Harden is sort of living off the reputation from the past that hasn’t shown itself in present day. His clutch rEFG% is -7.7% over the last three years despite a career cutch rEFG% of +1.9%. He’s taken 10.5% of his team’s clutch shots over the last 3 years compared to 20.3% for his career. In the playoffs, Harden owns an adjusted rTS% of +4.5% but has been -0.5% and -2.3% in two of the last playoff appearances.
So, for much of the complaints that exist about Garland, in not stepping up in ways or situations that Mitchell has needed assistance, exist with Harden present day despite having a long track record of success. Which Harden shows up will go a long way of deciding how effective this duo can be.
Let’s get this out of the way: Harden may be a “bigger body” which can show up in different ways as far as how the Cavs crossmatch, a cleaner ability to switch and a slight deterrence to mismatch hunting due to size not being an issue but it doesn’t show up in the defensive effectiveness.
Harden is having a career worst defensive year (which is saying something for him) and may be outdoing Garland.
He ranks 749th in defensive 3-factor RAPM which looks at a player’s impact on opponent TS%, TOV% and dREB%. Garland is 737th this year.
The Clippers defensive rating with Harden on the floor this year is 119.4 and drops to 111.2 when he’s off. For Garland, it’s similar – 118.9 defensive rating when on, and 111.3 when off. Garland has a partial excuse for being injured, Harden’s excuse may be apathy.
Harden provides a bit more value in his defensive activity, thanks to his size, in creating more deflections (63rd percentile), doing enough at/around the rim to be slightly above average and his size offering versatility defensively (almost 31% of his time spent defensively this year has been on SFs) that Garland can’t quite match.
But don’t get it twisted: The Clippers are bleeding points defensively with Harden on the floor this year. If Harden could turn back the clock to 23-24, or 22-23 Harden it would provide at least average defense to further amplify his offense, but his decreased defensive efficiency year-over-year is taking away from his still efficient offensive feats.
Just as the case with Mitchell and Garland, Harden and Mitchell are being paired for what they and produce offensively. If they can provide passable defense, and the offense takes care of itself, the duo will be successful. But if the offense doesn’t take of itself, then the defense is not likely anywhere near good enough to stand on its own and they’re in trouble a similar way they were with Garland and Mitchell.
I’ll end with one final note that… is interesting.
Across all playoff games with the Clippers, Harden had a -7.9 net rating. In Philadelphia it was a -4.9 net rating. You must go back to Brooklyn or Houston Harden before you found a positive playoff net rating.
The Cavs are getting Harden for 25+ regular season games but are really acquiring him for the potential 16 games after the regular season games. There are some warning signs for Harden’s recent underwhelming playoff performances that should bear note but his success or failure in Cleveland will be determined by how well he can prove those to be outliers, and Mitchell is the right pairing to do it with.