President of Basketball Operations held his end-of-year press conference two weeks ago to address the rubble from the Cavs postseason destruction.
Understandably, he didn’t say much and left some to grumble with what he did say. However, as most have come to realize, media interactions with Altman typically do not bear the fruit most fans would hope -- but there’s still some myth and fact to be deciphered.
Now that the dust has settled, and there’s been time to digest, we dive into the myths and facts that came from the press conference, and how that might shape this offseason.
“We’ve built and constructed this roster to take those kind of blows [in the 2nd Apron]. It’s one thing if you’re still needing to add core pieces and you’re in the 2nd Apron. It’s another thing if you didn’t have the success, you think you can have and you’re in the 2nd Apron, you kind of have to get out of the 2nd Apron to build or reconstruct.”
Verdict: Fact
Everything Koby says here is correct, it’s just a matter of which position he (or you) believe the Cavs to be in: Still needing to add core pieces or having those core pieces.
As we’ve maintained: If you believe in the core, then the Cavs are well positioned to handle the 2nd Apron. They have their top-7 players locked up for at least the next two years with young players like Jaylon Tyson and Craig Porter Jr in tow, and an owner willing to spend if it means keeping Sam Merrill and Ty Jerome. They can spend if they want, and have natural pivot point upcoming next year with one-year left on Mitchell’s deal; in 2027-2027 when De’Andre Hunter, Max Strus and Isaac Okoro all become free agents; and in 2028-2029 when just Evan Mobley and Jarrett Allen are slated to be on the books. Said otherwise: The Cavs can duck the 2nd Apron draft pick penalties in due time if they want and have the continual flexibility to pivot if this doesn’t work out.
However, some have concerns for the Cavs because they’re entering the 2nd Apron at a time when there’s further questions about the core and the 2nd Apron status makes it more difficult to pivot and remain competitive at the same time. They cannot aggregate salaries unless they’re out of the 2nd Apron (before or because of such a deal). They cannot take back more than 100% in a trade. They cannot acquire a signed-and-traded player and can only acquire picks and cash in return for signing-and-trading their player. They can only sign free agents to veteran minimums, and don’t have access to any free agent exceptions. All that to say: You better like what you have because it’s hard to deal otherwise.
Koby is correct in his assessment of the 2nd Apron, but it remains to be seen which side of the fence the Cavs are actually on.
“We actually had a pretty good offensive efficiency in the playoffs, even through that (challenges in getting the ball up the court due to pressure).”
Verdict: Fact – to an extent.
While it wasn’t the offensive success the Cavs saw during the regular season, the Cavs were tied for 3rd in 2nd Round offensive rating at 112.6. However, it was a significant step down from the league leading 121 oRTG during the regular season and historic 136.2 oRTG in the 1st Round. Of course, it just so happened to come against the 2nd Round’s best offensive performance with the Indiana Pacers posted a 116.7 oRTG.
The Cavs TOV% in the 2nd Round was 13.6% which was 3rd best in the 2nd Round and in line with their regular season TOV% of 13.1%.
So, yes, in comparison to other teams in the 2nd Round the offensive efficiency was comparable but it was a significant drop in comparison to how they performed leading up to that point which is the issue.
“We won the possession battle, we won the offensive rebounding battle, we won the rebounding battle, we lost the shooting battle.”
Verdict: Some myth, some fact.
The possession battle was close with the Cavs having a slight edge for the series 507 possessions to 504 possessions. But it's how each team used those possessions that made the difference.
Despite the Cavs winning the total possession battle, the Pacers were also the more efficient team on a points per possession basis in four out of the five games. They averaged 120.42 pts/poss per game compared to the Cavs at 113.96 pts/poss per game.
So while Cavs won the possession battle as a total they lost it substantially on a per possession basis across all five games.
The Cavs did win the rebounding battle, but it was weighted by their significant offensive rebounding advantage. The Cavs posted 31.6% oREB rate, 73.3% dREB rate and 53.4% overall rebound rate. The Pacers posted a 22.2% oREB rate, 74.4% dREB rate and 49.8% overall rebound rate.
The raw numbers tell a different story with the Cavs averaging 44.7 rebounds per game compared to the Pacers 39.6 rebounds per game, so Koby is right in that case. But the efficiency battle shows a team that won the rebounding advantage due to their offensive rebounding success.
There’s really no reason to get into the shooting battle – the Pacers shot 50.4% from the field and 42.1% from three compared to the Cavs 42.6% from the field and 29.4% from three. Said otherwise, the Pacers posted a true shooting percentage (considers FGs and FTS) of 61.8% and effective field goal percentage (adjusts to account for threes and twos accordingly) of 58.5% -- both 2nd Round bests. The Cavs posted a 54.7% TS% and 49% eFG%.
In the end, Koby is partially right here but paints a picture of the it being a lot closer than it was. They won the possession battle in total but weren't nearly as efficient or effective with their possessions as the Pacers, they won the rebounding battle but it was because they dominated the offensive boards, and they lost the shooting battle.
“We’re going to go as a franchise as Evan Mobley is going to go.”
Verdict: Fact
There is some nuance here, as the Cavs also need their core four to play like their core four and their role players to not turn into pumpkins, but the playoffs are about your best players and if Mobley ascends to the Cavs best player it will provide a higher ceiling and higher margin for error.
The concern has always been if a smaller backcourt can succeed in the playoffs, and the answer has always been if Mobley can score, he can offset the size concerns with his combination of scoring and size. Perhaps the backcourt was always meant to be the ancillary option instead of the primary option.
Mobley took quite the step this year – Defensive Player of the Year, All-NBA 2nd Team and All-Star. It’s only something the likes of Kawhi Leonard, Joakim Noah, Dwight Howard, Kevin Garnett, Ben Wallace, Gary Payton, Hakeem Olajuwon, David Robinson and Sidney Moncrief have done. Not bad company.
On top of that, he increased his offensive frequencies (13 FGA/36 to 15.1 FGA/36; 1.4 3PA/36 to 3.8 3PA/36 and 20.6 USG% to 23.2 USG%) all the while keeping his offensive efficiency (62.6% TS% to 63.3% TS% to 60% eFG% to 60.4% eFG%). It’s one thing to increase workload but it’s another to maintain efficiency while doing so.
Most notable within the last sentence is his three-point shot which became a more consistent, reliable weapon. While he shot .03% worse this year, he did so with a three-point rate that more than doubled – from 10.7% of his shots to 25.4% of his shots. Three-point effectiveness is as much volume as it is accuracy, and Mobley showed both this year.
The next step for Mobley is continuing to expand his offensive game – he shot just 39% on short-mid range shots and 23% on long mid-range shots for a total of 28th percentile on all mid-range shots; and continue to scale up his touches – he was at 57.9 touches per game this year which is actually down from 59.4 touches per game from last year but closer to Mitchell’s and Garland’s touches. This extends especially in the playoffs where Mobley cannot once again finish third in touches per game.
If folks want to point to size as the reason why the Cavs haven't won in the playoffs, and why other teams have won in the playoffs (Jokic, Giannis, Duncan, Dirk, Gasol, Garnett) then look no further than Mobley.
“These are the experiences you have to go through to get to the next level. It happens. Oklahoma City, number one seed in the West, lost in the 2nd Round. And this year, they got over that hump. … Denver’s core that they kept together, finally breaking through for a championship. Took seven years of the Celtics of break through to win a championship.”
Verdict: It’s complicated.
He’s not wrong on the surface but the comparisons are more oranges to apples than they are apples to apples. There's a lesson to be learned but also context to be applied.
The Thunder and Cavs have had mirrored rises – the Thunder going from 22 wins to 24, 40, 57 and 68 in the span of five years. In that same time, the Cavs went from 22 wins to 44, 51, 48 and 64.
Where the correlation diverges is the Cavs have made the playoffs three times in that span and haven’t made it past the 2nd Round. The Thunder made the playoffs for the second time and have made the NBA Finals all in the same year -- they had one playoff flameout, not three. The ascent was similar but scaling the top was much quicker by the Thunder. If the Thunder had this many playoff disappointments the discussions may be the same but losing the 1st time in the playoffs versus losing for the third time in the playoffs are not the same parallel.
The Nuggets won the Finals in their 5th year with the core but also made the Conference Finals in their 2nd year with their core. So, while there was playoff disappointment, they also went further, earlier, than the Cavs ever have. They also have a top-5 player in the game.
Yes, it took the Celtics seven years to win a title. But they also went to three Conference Finals and one other Finals in that time span. That is not the same as the Cavs failing to win more than a game in the 2nd Round over the last two years.
If the Cavs made it past the 2nd Round, there would be more people willing to believe this works and there just needs to be adjustments. Yes, there were questions about those teams’ configuration but there was also some sort of success to fall back upon – the Cavs do not have that same type of safety net.
The Thunder and Celtics also went out and made the type of necessary moves to clear that hump. The Thunder traded Josh Giddey for a win now piece in Alex Caruso and spent on Isaiah Hartenstein. The Celtics traded a core piece in Marcus Smart for a better fitting piece in Kristaps Porzingis, and lured Jrue Holiday away from the Bucks. Those teams used their failures to not rest on their laurels and get better.
The other underlying piece that Koby fails to take into consideration in this comparison is it’s a whole new world in this CBA. This CBA will not allow teams to spend, and spend for five, six or seven years to see if the team can breakthrough. This new CBA will require quicker, more volatile actions as the penalties get harsher the more teams spend, and the longer teams spend.
So Koby can point to those teams as an example of patience paying off, but they had more success earlier on, made decisive moves when they didn’t and could afford to wait on their core (which the new CBA does not provide the teams the luxury of).
“We had the 2nd best offensive rating in the history of the NBA this year as an offensive group. That’s a new identity for us. And we kept and maintained our defensive identity at the same time.”
Verdict: Fact, until it wasn’t.
But… the problem wasn’t the regular season; it was the postseason. If they translated that type of success over into the postseason, or some semblance of it, then this would be more believable. But until they do, there will always be skepticism.
The Cavs improved their defensive rating from 112.1 in 23-24 to 111.8 in 24-25 while significantly improving their offensive rating to historic levels. Yes, this is all true.
But again… the playoffs.
The Cavs had an identity in the playoffs until they didn’t. The defense fell by the wayside and the ball movement, shooting and offense supercharged by depth and the bench completely fell by the wayside.
The drove the ball less, passed the ball out of drives less, created less assist opportunities, had less touches, held the ball longer per touch, dribbled the ball more per touch and got less paint touches in the 2nd Round. So, the offensive flow and rhythm they played with in the regular season saw itself sapped in the postseason when it mattered most.
The defensive identity they balanced so well in the regular season was lost in the 2nd Round with a dRTG of 116.7 – 2.9 points worse than the next worst rated team.
So much of the offseason is trying to figure out how much of the regular season to weigh against the postseason with injuries and coaching styles furthering the conundrum. It’s why there’s a lot of, “yeah, but...” answers to ensue.
“We didn’t match that skillset in terms of shooting which we did all year. We had a bad week and a half.”
Verdict: Yeah, well…
The Cavs were 2nd in FG% and 3P% during the regular season – they shot 49.1% and 38.3% respectively. Even in the 1st Round they shot 51.8% FG% and 44% 3P%.
The 2nd Round was a disaster, but it begs the question: Is it just unlucky or a sign of a larger issue?
Outside of the Miami series, the Cavs have not shot the ball well over the last three playoffs.
New York: 44.9% FG, 32.7% 3P
Orlando: 44% FG, 28.7% 3P
Boston: 46% FG, 33.5 3P
Indiana: 42.6% FG, 29.4% 3P
It’s hard to be a team built on shot making if the shot making isn’t going to follow in the postseason. Koby has tried switching out different wing players and seemingly done a better job of it every year, but every year ends with the same result – perimeter failures.
The Cavs can say they had a back week and a half, to which they did, but it also brings to light a larger issue of bad shooting in the postseason outside of one series.
“There’s a championship window that we have here that’s wide open.”
Verdict: Fact
Now whether one believes in this core as a championship core, that’s another story but Koby is accurate to say the championship window is open.
Mobley is ascending. Garland and Mitchell are locked up, so are the role players. They stole a two-way wing at the trade deadline, and Dan Gilbert is ready to spend. They upgraded the coaching staff and established a newfound offensive style.
Boston also might have to undergo significant changes. Giannis could be gone, and Damian Lillard tore his Achilles. Philadelphia is in flux. The Knicks just fired their coach. Miami isn't really Miami anymore. And the four different teams have made the Eastern Conference Finals over the last five years with the last repeat winners being the 2017 and 2018 Cavaliers.
So yes, the window is ripe for the taking which makes this season even more difficult to bear. The pathway was there for the taking and the Cavaliers failed to step up. Can they do it again? That’s the multi-hundred-million-dollar question facing Gilbert and Altman next year.
“We navigated the regular season so well with injuries. This is by far the best season we’ve had from a prevention standpoint.”
Verdict: Fact.
Again: Another item that is so frustrating to see it turn out the way it did since the Cavs did everything right only for it to go completely wrong at the completely worst time.
Koby is right – the Cavs were 7th best in cumulative cash missed during the regular season – meaning the Cavs had the 7th least amount of salary miss time due to injury. This was the best ranking in the post-LeBron era.
Allen played 82 games. Garland played his most games as a Cav. Mitchell played in the most games since 2018-2019. Jerome played a career high minute.
The only issue is the health meant nothing when it came time. Garland hurt his toe on an inauspicious play. Mitchell was limited and banged up. Mobley hurt his ankle. Hunter dislocated his shooting thumb. All this happened within the span of a few games in the playoffs after all the health the Cavs experienced during the regular season.
Health can be somewhat unpredictable – do all the right things but not see the results. Tom Thibodeau ran his guys into the ground yet was one of the healthiest teams all year including the postseason.
The Cavs very much believe in their depth not because it creates a longer lasting, sustaining impact but it allows players to be more well rested during the full season and postseason. The Cavs are believers in sports science and there’s data to back up their beliefs. But when it came down to it, even though it was a valid process the results were not.
“Jarrett remains incredibly important to us, and we’re not a 64-win and one seed without him.”
Verdict: It’s complicated.
Like so many other answers before, there’s more to the story than just the headline quote.
Yes, the Cavs were successful this year in large part due to Allen. He led the team in win shares per 48 minutes, led the team in overall win shares, was 4th in offensive box-plus minus, 3rd in defensive box-plus minus and 1st in value over replacement players. The advanced stats all point to Allen being a meaningful player who had a direct impact on winning.
Even as it pertained to the playoffs, those types of numbers still showed through. 1st in win shares per 48 minutes, 1st in defensive box-plus minus, 4th in offensive box plus-minus and 3rd in value over replacement player.
But where that story takes a turn is how the story ended – Just 11 points, 6 rebounds, 1 assist, 1 block and 1 steal in 50 minutes over the last two losses to end the year. After posting back-to-back double doubles with 5 blocks and efficient shooting, Allen went the complete other way and brought up old wounds that some thought had healed.
Allen was rebounding well offensively and playing at a high level through the first three games, but the on-again, off-again motor and focus showed up at the worst juncture. In the same way you never know what you may get from Garland’s injuries, you also don’t know what you’re going to get with Allen’s effort.
We’ve seen it all too often where Allen’s focus ebbs and flows for reasons unknown and in turn so does his play. That type of rebounding effort at his size, when he had shown he was capable of so much more, is unacceptable.
Allen is no doubt an important part of the success the Cavs saw last year but how much can they depend on him? Does his production stand in the way of Mobley’s ascension?
As with most of the other questions the Cavs face: How much do you value what has happened in the regular season compared to what has happened in the postseason?
Allen’s return likely hinges on the market for his services. There are likely a handful of teams willing to pay to upgrade their center spot but only a few willing to provide the type of pieces the Cavs would want in such a deal. But in any such move, it brings in a solution but opens another problem.
Allen was part of the solution this year but also could be part of the solution in taking the next step just like the Celtics had to do with Smart and the Thunder did with Giddey.
“We gotta take caution before we say we’d be better off without Jarrett or find something better…. Myles Turner is an incredible example of how you stick with a guy and reap the benefits of that.
We gotta be careful. – Jarrett was a former All-Star, played 82 games – you’re not going to get much better if we’re talking about moving away from Jarrett. He’s an important part of the core.”
Verdict: Fact, to an extent.
Myles Turner is yet another cautionary tale Koby is trying to validate his likely stance of bringing the band back together.
He’s not wrong overall – Turner was a player bandied about for quite some time, but the Pacers stuck with him, took it on a year-by-year basis and are seeing the fruits of their labor. Now, they’re in the NBA Finals and key Turner is a key piece in that.
But on the flipside, Turner is the positional archetype (three-and-D big) that Allen is not. There is also the inverse of this happening with John Collins in Atlanta. Eternally on the trade block, Collins was finally moved in 2023. While he’s been productive in Utah, his departure freed up more playing time for Jalen Johnson and Onyeka Okongwu to blossom. While the Cavs do not have another player to assume Allen’s starting role, there is the question of does Allen departure’s do more for others than it does in acquiring another player to start for Allen.
Over the last three playoffs, the Cavs have ranked 55th, 8th and 20th in points per possession offensively with both bigs on the floor. With Allen off and Mobley on, the Cavs have ranked 88th, 26th, and 0 in points per possession offensively. Does the offense get better with Mobley shifted to full-time center?
Does the defense drop off? With Mobley on and Allen off, the Cavs ranked 26th, 62nd, and 100th in points per possession defensively in the playoffs. With both bigs on the floor, the Cavs ranked 37th, 92nd and 91st. The answer was a significant yes but to that extent the Cavs also must ask themselves who they want to be and where their priorities lie. Is it with Mobley and his development? Or do they believe they can still reach the heights with Mobley with Allen, and there’s still room to grow?
The trouble in trading Allen is it not only requires another starting player up front but it also brings about the need for a backup center. Being a 2nd Apron team doesn’t provide a tremendous amount of agility to fill holes in multiple ways – it’s either trade (which has restrictions) minimum salaried free agent signings. It’s why any Allen trade would be threading the needle. And to Koby’s point, is Rui Hachimura that much better in the starting lineup? Wendell Carter Jr? Does Keegan Murray solve some of the defensive, rebounding and toughness questions the frontline faced?
“We firmly believe in that group of players, and they’ve answered a lot of questions of if they can fit together.”
Verdict: Some fact, some myth.
Have we?
Once again, the answer falls somewhere in the middle due to the significant regular season and playoff split.
Core Four
Regular season percentiles
2022-2023: 87th offensively, 80th defensively
2023-2024: 40th offensively, 88th defensively
2024-2025: 92nd offensively, 88th defensively
Postseason percentiles
2022-2023: 28th offensively, 79th defensively
2023-2024: 7th offensively, 88th defensively
2024-2025: 9th offensively, 15th defensively
Injuries and coaching styles aside, the fact the core four hasn’t been able to register above a 28th percentile offense in the playoffs is concerning. The last two postseasons have seen significant injuries tied to offensive efficiency drops but is this just a regular season offense?
The backcourt
Regular season percentiles
2022-2023: 89th offensively, 87th defensively
2023-2024: 63rd offensively, 87th defensively
2024-2025: 95th offensively, 62nd defensively
Postseason percentiles
2022-2023: 22nd offensively, 55th defensively
2023-2024: 15th offensively, 78th defensively
2024-2025: 50th offensively, 3rd defensively
The most ironic part about “small” backcourt is despite the criticisms; they’ve still consistently managed to put out a viable defensive product. The postseason series against Indiana dragged down their defensive rating which otherwise has been strong in both the regular and postseason – this is even consistent with the core four lineups.
However, despite drastically improved offense this year the product remained average in the playoffs. If the defense is just good enough, the offense must be better than just good enough to win, and it hasn’t. If the backcourt wants to succeed with their deficiencies it has to be on the offensive end of the floor.
The bigs
Regular season percentiles
2022-2023: 87th offensively, 88th defensively
2023-2024: 36th offensively, 78th defensively
2024-2025: 91st offensively, 86th defensively
Postseason percentiles
2022-2023: 20th offensively, 91st defensively
2023-2024: 8th offensively, 92nd defensively
2024-2025: 55th offensively, 37th defensively
Sense a consistent trend here? The defensively is consistently at levels that they can win however the offense simply is not. And again, the pairing has not been able to be better than a 55th percentile offensively in the playoffs. If the pairing is to succeed it’s when the offense is at a winnable level with both on the floor in the postseason.
We’ve now seen this team win 163 regular season games over the last three years but just two games in the 2nd Round. So, while this team has shown to be successful questions remain if they can be as successful as they want to be.
“The one thing it [2nd Apron] does is it allow you to do is retain your talent. You gotta make some tough decisions and it puts downward pressure on the roster but we get to retain our best players.”
Verdict: Fact
There will be down the road consequences of remaining in the 2nd Apron, like freezing of draft picks (so not tradeable) and picks moving automatically to the back of the 1st Round, but to Koby’s point the 2nd Apron does allow teams to retain talent. The question is to what cost is it worth it to the teams.
The 2nd Apron does not have any restrictions on what you can pay their own free agents – they can pay them the same as they would be under the cap. The only difference is how it’s taxed.
The further teams go into the 2nd Apron, the heavier they are taxed. This also multiplies further when teams are considered to be a repeater tax team (when they’ve been in the luxury tax three out of four years). The standard rate goes from 1.50 times the amount teams are over the tax all the way up to 7.25 times the amount teams are over the tax.
So, for the Cavs, they’re currently projected to be ~$29M over the tax without any free agent signings, or resignings. This puts their expected tax bill at around $92.8M – that’s with 11 roster spots and the need to fill at least three more. If the next roster spot would go to Ty Jerome with a starting salary at $14M next year, it would cost Dan Gilbert an additional $86M at the end of next year. Is Jerome worth essentially $100M next year alone?
(If the Cavs were to dump Isaac Okoro’s salary into cap space to see savings in the tax bill, Jerome at a $14M salary would still cost Gilbert an approximately $17M tax bill next year. But $17M is a lot different than $86M or basically what Gilbert is paying Donovan Mitchell and Jarrett Allen in salaries next year.)
This is where Koby mentioning you have to make tough decisions and putting downward pressure on the roster applies. Ultimately, it will be determined by how much Gilbert is willing to fork over for the roster next year but there comes a limit. Even the richest owner in team sports (Steve Ballmer) had a limit. If this team made it to the Finals, or won, then there may be a different spending threshold then one that hasn’t won more than a game in Round 2 in each of the last two years. We're seeing this with the Celtics in real time: They were willing to spend when it was good but looking to adjust when it wasn't.
What that spending limit will be? To be determined. But, either way, it does increase the importance of lower cost rotation players and the development of others to take the spot of more expensive players. For instance, Jerome’s departure could place pressure on Craig Porter Jr to fill that role and Sam Merrill’s departure could open opportunities for Jaylon Tyson. Even Nae'Qwan Tomlin may be looked at to potentially fill Dean Wade's minutes if he's moved. All must be ready and the success of teams in the luxury tax is the ability to cheaply replace players when others are due for a raise.
“I think we can dispel that Darius and Donovan can’t play together – I think that can be thrown out in terms of the success they had this year.”
Verdict: Fact-ish?
The verdict likely depends on your feelings of regular season and postseason success. Yes, it’s clear (and the data supports it) that the two can win a lot of games, put up tremendous offensive numbers and be part of good defenses. There’s no debating that.
How it transitions and looks like in the postseason is a different story, and one that is mired with injuries. But we do have small sample sizes to look at.
The overall net rating for the backcourt in the postseason is as follows: this year -12.1, last year -4.9, and the year before -1.6.
Not too promising, eh? It’s those types of numbers, across three years and 20 playoff games, that puts into doubt what any regular season number says.
Health has played a factor in effectiveness, no doubt. In just factoring in the “healthy” games for Garland (New York and Miami series) the net ratings look like this: this year-6.1, and versus New York a -1.6.
If Mobley is added into those healthy pairings, the net ratings improve to -2 this year and +2 against New York.
Koby is right that Darius and Donovan can play together but whether they can be part of effective, high-level postseason basketball remains to be seen.
“We supplement a small backcourt with tremendous size and length. We were 4th in the playoffs defensively – that’s what you would point to defensively because we don’t have the height defensively.”
Verdict: Fact.
One minor point: The Cavs finished 5th in playoff dRTG but who is counting?
Otherwise, there is some truth to the statement and is why people (RCF included) that have been pining for inserting De’Andre Hunter into the starting lineup moving forward.
Let’s look at the backcourt pairings with strong defenders next to them on the wing in the postseason:
2022-2023 defensive backcourt percentile: 55th
With Okoro: 100th percentile
With LeVert: 32nd percentile
2023-2024 defensive backcourt percentile: 78th
With Okoro: 71st percentile
With Wade: 100th percentile
With LeVert: 84th percentile
(There wasn’t a large enough sample size with some of the pairings depending on the year)
In 3 of the 5 occasions, the overall defense improved with a better wing defender and in 4 of the 5 scenarios the defense was above average.
So yes, there is something to pairing the smaller backcourt with length all around them to offset any sizing deficiencies. However, part of that issue has been guys like Wade and Okoro not being able to shoot well enough to keep their defense on the court thus forcing more minutes on Cedi Osman and Sam Merrill, who while try hard defensively, don’t have the physical profile of players you want next to the guards. So size is one thing, size that can defend and shoot is another (which has escaped this team for years).
“He’s had maybe better statistical years, but this is one of the most efficient he’s ever had. He’s took a step back minutes, he took a step back in usage and field goal attempts, to make sure these guys grow. We have to get these guys there to get to Donovan’s level.”
Verdict: Part fact, part myth.
Well…
This was the lowest minutes per game Mitchell averaged in his career and lowest FGA per game since his rookie year. His step back was both noticeable and intentional to relieve the burden on Mitchell in hopes of growing others to prepare them for their playoff roles. And while that was the plan, we see how that worked (unfortunately) – not likely due to a bad process, just it didn’t work out.
In looking at Mitchell’s efficiency, it’s not clear the step back helped him all that much. His FG%, 3P%, TS%, eFG% were all the lowest of his career as a Cavalier. His FG% was the lowest since 20-21, 3P% lowest since 21-22, TS% lowest since 21-22 and eFG% lowest since 20-21.
Drilling down into scoring and shooting further, his points per shot attempt has declined year over year in Cleveland and was the lowest since 21-22. His shot accuracy at the rim was the 2nd lowest of his career behind the 20-21 season along with his long mid-range efficiency being the 2nd lowest as well. On the bright side? His short mid-range was the 2nd highest of his career was his corner three efficiency.
In other advanced stats like PER or win shares per 48 minutes, those were not necessarily any better. His PER has decreased year over year and was the lowest since the 19-20 season. His win shares per 48 did tick up from last year ever so slightly but was not a career best by any stretch.
Looking at things a different way: His rebounds per 36 minutes were a career high, his assists per 36 minutes were the 2nd highest in his career, and his turnovers per 36 minutes were at a career low.
Depending on how Koby defines efficiency there could be some truth in there, but the numbers reveal a much bigger step back then perhaps the leading statement of, “one of the most efficient years he’s ever had” line indicates.