How Grant, Cavs botched the Thunder's blueprint
The news of Chris Grant's surprising dismissal as general manager of the Cavaliers has been the topic
du jour in NBA circles since the news was handed down Thursday.
"I was actually talking to my owner about it," said a rival GM. "We agreed that GMs should be fired way more often than they are. If you're going to fire somebody, the coach shouldn't always get the axe."
On his way out the door, one of David Stern's final declarations was that his final collective bargaining agreement would create a new era of management, in which the failures or successes of teams would revolve around the planning and execution of their front-office executives. So far three GMs have exited this season -- Glen Grunwald was fired in September by the Knicks, Gersson Rosas resigned in October from the Mavericks, and Grant was put down amid a six-game losing streak and a 16-33 start in what had been heralded by owner Dan Gilbert as a season for returning to the playoffs.
"We all know who is really running that team -- it's Dan Gilbert," said a rival executive, who believed the arrival of
Andrew Bynum damaged the team socially. "It's obvious that those players don't enjoy playing together," he went on. "They're all looking around to see who the second-best player is, and each one of them thinks he's it."
The Cavs have gone 80-199 since they were abandoned by
LeBron James. The curse set forth by Gilbert that night in 2010 has boomeranged against him and his franchise karmically. "Chris had one of the toughest jobs you could possibly have -- high picks in really bad drafts," said the rival GM of Grant, who was hired to replace
Danny Ferry in that lost summer of 2010.
Like so many rebuilding teams, the Cavaliers tried to follow the example of the Thunder, who continue to be one of the most-copied and least-understood franchises in the NBA. The formula of Oklahoma City GM Sam Presti has been boiled down to the first-round picks he made in three successive drafts:
2007: Kevin Durant (No. 2),
Jeff Green (No. 5 via trade with Boston)
2008: Russell Westbrook (No. 4),
Serge Ibaka (No. 24)
2009: James Harden (No. 3)
Those look like no-brainer picks now. But in fact, Durant was the only obvious star at the time of those drafts. There was no clear-cut choice to be made at No. 5 in 2007 when Presti settled on Green, who has turned into the third-most productive player from his draft (after Durant and
Al Horford, who went No. 3 to Atlanta). Four years later, Presti would trade Green in order to create more opportunities for Ibaka and Harden.
In 2008, I could find no one in the league apart from Presti who believed that Westbrook could be a star. After being tipped off that Presti was deciding between Westbrook and
Brook Lopez, I remember calling rival GMs and scouts who laughed at the idea of picking Westbrook as high as No. 4; some highly respected executives believed that he lacked the basic point guard skills to start in the NBA.
In 2009, Harden was in danger of sliding in the draft. If the Thunder had not taken him at No. 3, the Bucks were optimistic at that time that he might be available for them at No. 10 (where they wound up with
Brandon Jennings instead).
Westbrook and Harden turned out to be far better than anticipated by many rival teams, but here is the neglected aspect of their rise to the top of the league: They joined a franchise that invested fully in their improvement. The staff of coach Scott Brooks, who took over 13 games into Westbrook's rookie year, has set the standard for developing young talent. Consider the long list of homegrown players who have thrived in Oklahoma City, including Durant, Green, Westbrook, Harden, Ibaka, and now
Reggie Jackson and
Jeremy Lamb. This does not happen by accident.
The Seattle SuperSonics (as they were known then) had been trying to win for two years when Presti arrived in 2007 and immediately traded All-Stars
Ray Allen and
Rashard Lewis. They endured one and a half horrible seasons before showing improvement in the latter half of 2008-09, which was the prelude to their 50-win breakthrough in 2009-10.
So many teams that are rebuilding through the draft think of their losing years as a lost time that must be suffered like a plague. For Presti and Brooks in Oklahoma City, for Larry Bird and his coaches at Indiana, and for other teams that have built up through the draft, the years of losing are not a waste of time. They become years of investment, during which the GM and coach establish, under stress, how they will behave when they are on top of the league.
It is the secret of rebuilding. If they don't focus on their daily work as if they're winning already, then they never will win.
The approach of Brooks when his team was 3-29 is the same as his approach now that they're pursuing a second NBA Finals in three years. Jackson and Lamb and rookie
Steven Adams are benefiting from the same daily regimen of intensive work that made stars out of Westbrook and Harden when few saw the potential in them.
It is true that Grant had the misfortune of running Cleveland's draft in years when there was a dearth of franchise talent. It's also true that he made a terrific 2011 deadline trade to absorb the expensive contract of
Baron Davis in exchange for the unprotected pick that turned into Irving. Much as Durant fell into the lap of Presti, so too did Irving arrive like a miracle in Cleveland.
Otherwise, Grant's drafting record wasn't terrific. Three spots after landing Irving, he used the No. 4 pick on
Tristan Thompson. Grant could have gone instead with center
Jonas Valanciunas, who slid to No. 5 to Toronto because he would be forced to finish his European contract overseas for one year; the Cavaliers could have withstood that absence. "The one I criticize the most is Valanciunas," said a rival GM. "He isn't setting the world on fire, but I was surprised they didn't go for him in that situation."
"Chris traded well, but he didn't draft well," said another GM. "Pick Klay (Thompson, who went No. 11 to the Warriors) or Valanciunas instead of Tristan Thompson."
Dion Waiters (No. 4 in 2012),
Tyler Zeller (No. 17 in 2012 after a trade of picks with Dallas),
Sergey Karasev (No. 19 last year) and especially
Anthony Bennett, the reigning No. 1 pick, have been disappointing in one way or another. While the Cavs have had a pair of No. 1 picks in the last three years, it needs to be remembered that Grant tried to trade the pick last year and could find no takers because the draft was so weak.
"I still think Bennett will turn out to be a pretty good NBA starter," said a GM, in spite of Bennett's numbers (3.3 ppg, 28.9 percent shooting overall). "He'll wind up being in the top 10-15 in the league at his position."
There are two ways to look at the disaster in Cleveland. Maybe Grant should have drafted better.
Or maybe -- and more importantly -- the Cavaliers haven't been focused, with discipline and perseverance, on developing the young talent they've acquired over the last few years. Would Tristan Thompson have become a better player in Oklahoma City?
The Cavaliers as they exist today are an underachieving and disorderly team. The dismissal of Grant may ultimately have had less to do with the players he chose than with the way he developed them once he had them.