The ISIS offensive in Iraq

[Jordan]

But there isn't a single driving force or factor. Radical Islamists come from all segments of society and from many different nations -- without any commonality that has yet been identified in this thread. The reason a particular individual adopts those beliefs may be very personal to him/her. Why are some attracted to those beliefs, when others in virtually identical societal circumstances are not?

Shit, you've got some nutbag, relatively affluent western women who go there believing they'll fill some hole in their lives. Their motives may be completely different from those of a jihadi young man from western Libya. But you can still treat the disease itself even if you don't exactly understand how a particular person contracted it.



It makes perfect sense in the context of combating either. The "causes" or "driving force" of racism may vary wildly between individuals, and yet, we can still combat it directly by pointing out how/why it is wrong, and convincing people that no matter how they got to that point, it is unacceptable.



Guess we just needed to get a bit more touchy-feely with the Nazis, then. Because that was an "opposing philosophy" too, right?

Anyway, you seem to be assuming that a single congruent reference point actually exists in the first place. I don't see the evidence of that. And if so, what is that 'congruent reference point"? Jking claims it is economic class. What do you claim it is?

Because I think I'm the one being open-minded in terms of not trying to cram the same motive down the throats of all those individuals. I accept that motives vary widely between individuals, and that it actually would be closed-minded to assign a preferred "congruent reference point" to all those individuals.

To focus on jking's economic point, the reality is that not only will the poor always be with us, but economic differences will always be with us as well. Moreover, we lack the practical ability to eliminate those differences anyway, even in our own nation. Therefore, even if jking was right about poverty and economic class in general being the driving force behind Islamism (which doesn't explain all those wealthy and middle-class Islamists, but whatever...) it's a conclusion that leads nowhere because we cannot stop that alleged "cause".

And again, the majority of people living in those same economic conditions are not becoming radical Islamists. Which means there is something else driving those people other than economic conditions.

I feel like you are not understanding my explanation of structural, political economic factors. I've said over and over again it is not just class, and not just poverty, but how these tools are utilized in the Middle East. I've cited scholars that explain, while in the United States class is entirely based on economic well being, this does not stand true in the Middle East. So, in one last ditch effort to explain my argument about structuralism and class-conflict in the Middle East I will cite who in my opinion was a God of Middle-Eastern studies, Nazih Ayubi, he claims:
“The class nature of such a society manifests a dispersed, fluid class map with classes excessively dependent on the state and with many intermediate strata in existence.” Therefore, and this is crucial to Syria, class structures are inherent in political economy analysis. Furthermore, Ayubi contends that there are two important types of regime control. “In situations where the preservation and enhancement of the privileges of the group that captured the state would require preserving the status quo (without necessarily rejecting economic growth or artificial modernization), the ruling caste would strive to co-opt other groups in a ‘consociational’ manner if possible. This situation is true of the oil-exporting countries of Arabia and the Gulf (Ayubi 1996, 25).”

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

I feel like you are not understanding my explanation of structural, political economic factors. I've said over and over again it is not just class, and not just poverty, but how these tools are utilized in the Middle East. I've cited scholars that explain, while in the United States class is entirely based on economic well being, this does not stand true in the Middle East. So, in one last ditch effort to explain my argument about structuralism and class-conflict in the Middle East I will cite who in my opinion was a God of Middle-Eastern studies, Nazih Ayubi, he claims:
“The class nature of such a society manifests a dispersed, fluid class map with classes excessively dependent on the state and with many intermediate strata in existence.” Therefore, and this is crucial to Syria, class structures are inherent in political economy analysis. Furthermore, Ayubi contends that there are two important types of regime control. “In situations where the preservation and enhancement of the privileges of the group that captured the state would require preserving the status quo (without necessarily rejecting economic growth or artificial modernization), the ruling caste would strive to co-opt other groups in a ‘consociational’ manner if possible. This situation is true of the oil-exporting countries of Arabia and the Gulf (Ayubi 1996, 25).”

And I don't think you're understanding why those facts don't prove your point, and ultimately aren't very useful in terms of combatting radical Islam. It's a deterministic explanation that doesn't appear to apply with any level of consistency. I'll just try a bullet point approach.

1) There are some people within those classes (whatever they are) that adopt radical Islamism/are radicalized, and some who don't. Your focus on class does not explain why that is.

2) Your explanation doesn't explain why those who do get radicalized adopt radical Islam rather than, say communism. Or why their opposition doesn't manifest itself as support for a liberal democratic regime with respect for individual rights, etc.. Why radical Islam?

3) Your explanation doesn't explain why people from all over the world who are not part of that Syrian social class structure, have joined the Syrian jihadis.

4) Your explanation doesn't explain the appeal of radical Islam in places other than Syria, including in the United States and elsewhere.

5) This explanation, at best, only describes how radical Islamism has manifested itself in the particular conditions of Syria. But that still doesn't prove that those conditions caused radical Islamism in Syria.

In other words, if we could wave a wand and have those distinctions no longer exist, would there still be radical Islamists in Syria, just not correlated along those same lines? Since radical Islamism manages to exist in a whole bunch of countries that don't have the same conditions as Syria, I don't see how changing those conditions would eliminate radical Islamism.

6) The ability of the U.S./West to actually change the deep-seated structural issues you identified is negligible, without an overt level of active interference that likely would cause more problems than it solves. So even if the form radical Islam takes in Syria correlates with "class", it really does us no good because that's not something we can really change anyway.

As far as I can tell, radical Islamists share only one characteristic/belief, that exists regardless of class, national origin, wealth, background, or whatever.

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

The Iranian gambit is going just swimmingly. If anyone thought that these negotiations might lead to a larger thaw, or some form of regional cooperation (or at least less regional antagonism), the Iranians nixed that idea hard, and reaffirmed they're going to keep doing exactly what they've been doing outside the nuclear context:

But Iran's supreme leader warned against expectations that even a done deal would mend the more than three-decade freeze between the two nations in place since the Iranian revolution and siege of the American Embassy, proclaiming that Washington and Tehran remained on opposite sides on most issues.

"Negotiations with America are solely on the nuclear issue and nothing else. Everyone has to know that," Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told a crowd in northeastern Iran on the first day of the Persian new year. "We do not talk with U.S. over regional issues. In the regional issues, America's goals are completely opposed to our goals."

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-iran-progress-nuclear-talks-deal-unclear/

That seems like a pretty flat declaration that whatever it is Iran does that leads them to be listed as a worldwide supporter of terrorism, they have no intention of stopping it. They apparently believe that they are doing the "right thing".

That kind of begs the question of what happens with the economic sanctions that are in place based on Iran's status as a state sponsor of terrorism. Does a nuclear deal result in the lifting of all sanctions, including all the things that are in place based on Iran's non-nuclear conduct? Because I find it hard to fathom that the Iranians would accept a deal in which we keep sanctions in place based on the logic of "well, these sanctions are for your support of terrorism, not your nuclear program, so they remain in place. We're only going to remove those other sanctions."

If that is correct, then a deal would mean that the Iran has successfully leveraged its nuclear program into a carte blanche for supporting terrorism.

I'm not sure it's possible for the parties to negotiate around that, and I'm not sure either side would give in on that point. The U.S. would look ridiculous if part of the deal was de-listing Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism when it has publicly avowed to continue doing the same things, and I can't see the mullahs agreeing to give up a nuclear program while other substantial sanctions remain in place.

That makes me think that this whole thing is nothing more than an Iranian attempt to buy time/avoid more severe sanctions for as long as possible.

 

[Jordan]

And I don't think you're understanding why those facts don't prove your point, and ultimately aren't very useful in terms of combatting radical Islam. It's a deterministic explanation that doesn't appear to apply with any level of consistency. I'll just try a bullet point approach.

1) There are some people within those classes (whatever they are) that adopt radical Islamism/are radicalized, and some who don't. Your focus on class does not explain why that is.

Last I checked humans are different from each other. As a species we have agency. I'm not sure why this is a refutation of my argument.

2) Your explanation doesn't explain why those who do get radicalized adopt radical Islam rather than, say communism. Or why their opposition doesn't manifest itself as support for a liberal democratic regime with respect for individual rights, etc.. Why radical Islam?

Because, as I've stated before in regards to Iran, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia the Islamists economic ideal is very similar to that of socialism. It's very similar to support for the Tea Party in the United States (no, I'm not saying the Tea Party are the same degree of problematic as Islamists). Support for the religious right in America, a lot of times, comes from people who aren't Christian because they support the candidates moral belief system. In Turkey, no citizen thought Erdogan was a radical when he was elected. They loved his economic policies and thought he had a strong moral compass. When they became frustrated in 2011 they started protesting. Again, you are ignoring the human agency of people in the Middle East.

3) Your explanation doesn't explain why people from all over the world who are not part of that Syrian social class structure, have joined the Syrian jihadis.

For the seventh time, I don't claim to know why people become Jihadis, i.e., ISIS. My analysis simply seeks to understand why people become Islamists. In case you don't know, Islamists are people who attempt to fuse the means and ends of Islam into politics. Those who do that and seek violence are Jihadists.

4) Your explanation doesn't explain the appeal of radical Islam in places other than Syria, including in the United States and elsewhere.

Dude, stop making strawmen, it is getting really irritating. I've stated numerous times that my analysis is focused on structural societies in the Middle East. I don't know about the United States. But I know for a fact class dynamics in the Middle East are a factor -- and, in my opinion, the most important factor -- in who joins Islamists organizations.

5) This explanation, at best, only describes how radical Islamism has manifested itself in the particular conditions of Syria. But that still doesn't prove that those conditions caused radical Islamism in Syria.

Yeah, it does. Islamists groups use religious economics to appeal to populist demands of those in lower political-economic classes.

In other words, if we could wave a wand and have those distinctions no longer exist, would there still be radical Islamists in Syria, just not correlated along those same lines? Since radical Islamism manages to exist in a whole bunch of countries that don't have the same conditions as Syria, I don't see how changing those conditions would eliminate radical Islamism.

Again, I'm focused on the Middle East. And I've given five examples of how these factors are the same in a lot of countries. My analysis does not deal with Islamists in the West, and for all I know, you are very possibly correct in these countries.

6) The ability of the U.S./West to actually change the deep-seated structural issues you identified is negligible, without an overt level of active interference that likely would cause more problems than it solves. So even if the form radical Islam takes in Syria correlates with "class", it really does us no good because that's not something we can really change anyway.

Where the hell did I say the United States/West can defeat Islamism in the Middle East? If you think that's possible you are out of your mind. The only way for that to happen is for leadership in the Middle East to undergo significant changes and over a 20-30 year period what Islamists promise will become irrelevant.

As far as I can tell, radical Islamists share only one characteristic/belief, that exists regardless of class, national origin, wealth, background, or whatever.

You and I probably only share limited characteristics. Maybe only one and that is being Cavs fans. That does not mean we are the same and government's could "deal" with us the same way. I know ignoring human agency makes these problems seem easier but it is really problematic.

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

Last I checked humans are different from each other. As a species we have agency. I'm not sure why this is a refutation of my argument.

If you agree that structural factors are only one reason why some people become Islamists, and that some become Islamist for unrelated reasons, then fine. But if you're going to claim those factors as the cause, then you're the one denying agency.

Because, as I've stated before in regards to Iran, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia the Islamists economic ideal is very similar to that of socialism. It's very similar to support for the Tea Party in the United States (no, I'm not saying the Tea Party are the same degree of problematic as Islamists). Support for the religious right in America, a lot of times, comes from people who aren't Christian because they support the candidates moral belief system. In Turkey, no citizen thought Erdogan was a radical when he was elected. They loved his economic policies and thought he had a strong moral compass. When they became frustrated in 2011 they started protesting. Again, you are ignoring the human agency of people in the Middle East.

This doesn't explain why people who support more socialist economic policies also want to restrict religious liberty and enforce religious orthodoxy via force. Why do they support religious intolerance/repression/bigotry? What is it that links those economic factors to religious extremism? Did they just invent that link out of a hat?

For the seventh time, I don't claim to know why people become Jihadis, i.e., ISIS. My analysis simply seeks to understand why people become Islamists. In case you don't know, Islamists are people who attempt to fuse the means and ends of Islam into politics. Those who do that and seek violence are Jihadists.

First, I tend to agree that answering the "why" is impossible -- that's why I disagreed with gourimoko's point that we have to understand all of the "why".

But second, people don't wake up one morning and decide to become violent for absolutely no reason at all. Before they engage in terrorism, they are Islamists. That applies to bin Laden and all the other middle class/wealthy I've been mentioning. I'm not asking (for this point) why they became terrorists -- I'm asking why they became Islamists.

Again, I'm focused on the Middle East. And I've given five examples of how these factors are the same in a lot of countries. My analysis does not deal with Islamists in the West, and for all I know, you are very possibly correct in these countries.

We've gone around on this a lot, and it's an important point, but I don't think we can resolve it. The existence of Islamism outside your structural environment demonstrates that there is a causal factor for Islamism that you haven't explained or identified. Something is appealing to those people. Unless you can identify what that is, you cannot know if it even exists as a causal factor within the geographic area you've identified. It may also be a major factor within the region you've identified.

The only thing Islamists share -- regardless of geography, class, or anything else, is a belief in Islam. So it seems logical to me that if you're going to combat Islamism, that's one place to start. And I'm not talking about combatting Islam. I'm talking about Islam changing/adapting to being less susceptible to become Islamism.

Where the hell did I say the United States/West can defeat Islamism in the Middle East? If you think that's possible you are out of your mind. The only way for that to happen is for leadership in the Middle East to undergo significant changes and over a 20-30 year period what Islamists promise will become irrelevant.

I didn't say "defeat" -- I asked what we could do to effect change. But if you're answer is that we really can't do anything to change those structural factors significantly, fine. I tend to agree. But I don't agree that changing those structural factors is the only way to affect Islamism, which I believe is naturally going to give rise to violent extremism.

 

[Jordan]

If you agree that structural factors are only one reason why some people become Islamists, and that some become Islamist for unrelated reasons, then fine. But if you're going to claim those factors as the cause, then you're the one denying agency.

Yeah, sorry if I have been confusing here, I think that structural factors are only one, but still the predominant reason why people in the Middle East become Islamist.

This doesn't explain why people who support more socialist economic policies also want to restrict religious liberty and enforce religious orthodoxy via force. Why do they support religious intolerance/repression/bigotry? What is it that links those economic factors to religious extremism? Did they just invent that link out of a hat?

I don't think they all do want to enforce religious orthodoxy via force. Erdogan's party in Turkey began using force in regards to economic policy in 2010 but they have not forced religion down the people's throat. Neither do the current Tunisian government nor Morsi (albeit, he did use force to control certain aspects of society, but not religion).

First, I tend to agree that answering the "why" is impossible -- that's why I disagreed with gourimoko's point that we have to understand all of the "why".

But second, people don't wake up one morning and decide to become violent for absolutely no reason at all. Before they engage in terrorism, they are Islamists. That applies to bin Laden and all the other middle class/wealthy I've been mentioning. I'm not asking (for this point) why they became terrorists -- I'm asking why they became Islamists.

I guess my thoughts on the "why" is we know people join for one of three very broad reasons: ideational (i.e., they agree with some aspect of the Islamists ideology); institutional (they think joining will help them overthrow corrupt institutions); and structural (some aspect of Islamism relates to how people feel about classist societies and that Islamism is the best hope to defeat the regime). I ultimately believe, for most Islamists, a combination of the three takes place.

And I agree, Islamism in the majority of cases is a precursor to Jihadism. But, the majority of Islamists are not Jihadists.

We've gone around on this a lot, and it's an important point, but I don't think we can resolve it. The existence of Islamism outside your structural environment demonstrates that there is a causal factor for Islamism that you haven't explained or identified. Something is appealing to those people. Unless you can identify what that is, you cannot know if it even exists as a causal factor within the geographic area you've identified. It may also be a major factor within the region you've identified.

Again, we need to consider human agency. The reason a westerner would want to join an Islamist group is very different than why someone would in the Middle East. For example, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, who at one point converted from Judaism to radical Islam and is now a Catholic, states in his account that he joined Islam because he had friends who he respected that were Muslim. He eventually joined an organization that funded Wahhabis as a "communications correspondent" and spiraled downwards. He did say, though, what was most attracting to him was the structure of the religion. In Marc Sageman's work about why people join Jihadist organization, in a survey of thousands of Islamists, he could not find one identifying factor. But, in the Middle East, they tended to be more frustrated with the classist institutions and this lead them to become Islamists, but not Jihadists. In the United States, however, people who joined Islamists groups were looking for a sense of belonging and could not care less about the institutions.

The only thing Islamists share -- regardless of geography, class, or anything else, is a belief in Islam. So it seems logical to me that if you're going to combat Islamism, that's one place to start. And I'm not talking about combatting Islam. I'm talking about Islam changing/adapting to being less susceptible to become Islamism.

Okay, but again, the only thing we may share is that we are Cavs fans, that does not mean that we are the same.

I didn't say "defeat" -- I asked what we could do to effect change. But if you're answer is that we really can't do anything to change those structural factors significantly, fine. I tend to agree. But I don't agree that changing those structural factors is the only way to affect Islamism, which I believe is naturally going to give rise to violent extremism.

I don't think the U.S. can do much to effect change. Islamism tends to lead to anti-Americanism and if you read Said Qutb he even claims as much. There is nothing Washington can do after people become Islamists sans changing oppressive institutions and structures in the Middle East while preventing the failing of states. So I think toppling Saddam could have led to a reduction of Islamism in Iraq if we worked to make sure de-baathification was not a shit show and instituted stable institutions. But, the whole dilemma the U.S. faced, is most countries in the Middle East did not have institutions that protected human rights. So what happens when regime's are toppled is the countries become failed states.

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

I don't think they all do want to enforce religious orthodoxy via force.

Just to be clear, when I'm talking about "force", I'm talking about any law that expressly favors one religion over the other, etc.. And otherwise, I agree with just about everything else you said in your entire post.

I don't think the U.S. can do much to effect change. Islamism tends to lead to anti-Americanism and if you read Said Qutb he even claims as much. There is nothing Washington can do after people become Islamists sans changing oppressive institutions and structures in the Middle East while preventing the failing of states.

I'd agree there is no magic bullet. But the point I was trying to get at with respect to your structural causes of Islamism is that there are similar structural issues in a great many nations. There are a lot of people who, for whatever reason, are not happy with their lot in life, or otherwise discontented with some aspect of existence. And I don't think that's ever going to change. So a pool of disaffected is always going to be there.

The real question is how they will choose to manifest that discontent, because some outlets are a whole lot more dangerous than others. For example, some disaffected teen or young guy in England may turn to soccer hooliganism. Someone else may become a hard-core political activist, or survivalist, or join a gang. And while all of those things are problematic at some level, they're generally manageable.

It's when you get to the bigger "isms" that you have real problem. It may be racism, Nazism, anarchism, radical Islamism, or something else. And I don't think we can or should simply throw up our hands and say "well, we can't change the fact that some people feel alienated/discontented, so we're stuck with whatever alternatives they choose."

Though it is not a magic bullet or easy solution, those more malignant ideologies should still be challenged publicly and directly, on their own merits. So even though not every racist is violent, we still call out racism as wrong, and educate against it. The same thing with Nazism. We don't want a revival of that even if socio-economic/structural conditions similar to those during the Weimar Republican were to arise again. And we try to prevent that by leaders publicly speaking out against it, educating, etc.. We change the way we talk about ethnicity, religion, national origin, etc., so as to be wary of the seeds that can be used as a vehicle for something else.

And that's my point about what should be happening with Islamism. As I've said elsewhere in these threads, the pernicious seed that is at the root of Islamism is the idea that religion is not a matter that should be left to personal conscience, but rather to the majority of the society and even the government. I think that is an idea that needs to be challenged and changed, just as we challenge ideas about race, ethnicity, and religion elsewhere..

 

[Jordan]

Just to be clear, when I'm talking about "force", I'm talking about any law that expressly favors one religion over the other, etc.. And otherwise, I agree with just about everything else you said in your entire post.



I'd agree there is no magic bullet. But the point I was trying to get at with respect to your structural causes of Islamism is that there are similar structural issues in a great many nations. There are a lot of people who, for whatever reason, are not happy with their lot in life, or otherwise discontented with some aspect of existence. And I don't think that's ever going to change. So a pool of disaffected is always going to be there.

The real question is how they will choose to manifest that discontent, because some outlets are a whole lot more dangerous than others. For example, some disaffected teen or young guy in England may turn to soccer hooliganism. Someone else may become a hard-core political activist, or survivalist, or join a gang. And while all of those things are problematic at some level, they're generally manageable.

It's when you get to the bigger "isms" that you have real problem. It may be racism, Nazism, anarchism, radical Islamism, or something else. And I don't think we can or should simply throw up our hands and say "well, we can't change the fact that some people feel alienated/discontented, so we're stuck with whatever alternatives they choose."

Though it is not a magic bullet or easy solution, those more malignant ideologies should still be challenged publicly and directly, on their own merits. So even though not every racist is violent, we still call out racism as wrong, and educate against it. The same thing with Nazism. We don't want a revival of that even if socio-economic/structural conditions similar to those during the Weimar Republican were to arise again. And we try to prevent that by leaders publicly speaking out against it, educating, etc.. We change the way we talk about ethnicity, religion, national origin, etc., so as to be wary of the seeds that can be used as a vehicle for something else.

And that's my point about what should be happening with Islamism. As I've said elsewhere in these threads, the pernicious seed that is at the root of Islamism is the idea that religion is not a matter that should be left to personal conscience, but rather to the majority of the society and even the government. I think that is an idea that needs to be challenged and changed, just as we challenge ideas about race, ethnicity, and religion elsewhere..

Yeah I agree with a whole lot of this. I also would add this is why I have been frustrated with the Iran deal. Not because i don't want one, I do, but in those agreements something about ending Iran's support for Hezbollah and Assad's massacres needs to be included. I guess what I'm saying is I don't believe the U.S. military is a hammer for any nails; but, I think Washington should engage in more political force on a lot of these issues.
Also, I'm glad that even though we disagree on a whole lot we could come to some sort of mutual, "agree to disagree" solution.

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

Yeah I agree with a whole lot of this. I also would add this is why I have been frustrated with the Iran deal. Not because i don't want one, I do, but in those agreements something about ending Iran's support for Hezbollah and Assad's massacres needs to be included.

I agree, but unfortunately, that doesn't seem to be the way things are going. As far as I can tell, the Iranians have said that there will be no linkage between a nuke deal and other issues, and I haven't heard anything coming out of the Washington either before or since indicating any disagreement.

 

[brownindian]

Honest Question - Can someone shed some light on the pros and cons of US agreeing with Iran on the nuclear deal?

 

[Sebastian]

Meanwhile, more information released on the NIE used by the Bush II Administration to justify the invasion of Iraq, which, as we all know, triggered the greatest Rube Goldberg device of our times....

"Thirteen years ago, the intelligence community concluded in a 93-page classified document used to justify the invasion of Iraq that it lacked "specific information" on "many key aspects" of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.

But that's not what top Bush administration officials said during their campaign to sell the war to the American public. Those officials, citing the same classified document, asserted with no uncertainty that Iraq was actively pursuing nuclear weapons, concealing a vast chemical and biological weapons arsenal, and posing an immediate and grave threat to US national security.

Congress eventually concluded that the Bush administration had "overstated" its dire warnings about the Iraqi threat, and that the administration's claims about Iraq's WMD program were "not supported by the underlying intelligence reporting." But that underlying intelligence reporting — contained in the so-called National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that was used to justify the invasion — has remained shrouded in mystery until now."


https://news.vice.com/article/the-c...ified-the-iraq-invasion?utm_source=vicenewsfb

 

[Jordan]

Honest Question - Can someone shed some light on the pros and cons of US agreeing with Iran on the nuclear deal?

I think @The Human Q-Tip would do a better job than me at explaining the Cons.

In my honest opinion, there are two enormous pros to the Iran deal:

1) It ends, or at least reduces sanctions against Iran, which have yet to harm the regime, but are killing the middle-class business owners in the country. In effect, these sanctions have made anti-American sentiment greater in Iran than before they began.

2) The way things are looking now we will go to war before Iran gets a nuclear weapon. Going to war in Iran would be akin to another Iraq, but the differences being many Iranians support the regime. Another difference, on the flip side, would be that Iran already has more institutions than Iraq when it comes to free speech, democratic values, etc. Although my biggest concern is another war in the Middle East, except Iran has support from Russia and China, so nowhere near as "easy" to stir the international community as Iraq. I don't know if you remember, but for Iraq it was as difficult as watching Brenden Haywood run laps to get international support. Iran will be worse.

The biggest negative in my opinion is a deal with Iran, unless the administration pushes hard, will make it clear the U.S. is supporting Assad's crushing of innocent Syrians.

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

Honest Question - Can someone shed some light on the pros and cons of US agreeing with Iran on the nuclear deal?

Obviously, that depends on the specifics of the deal, but I'd say the potential "cons" are generally based on the belief that Iran is going to continue cheating/concealing, will continue development of a nuke, and is just trying to get sanctions lifted/reduced in the meantime. Additionally:

1) Iran is currently not cooperating fully with the IAEA inspectors who are seeking to verify compliance with the protocols Iran already has signed. If they're refusing to be forthcoming now, and we're letting them get away with that by not imposing tougher sanctions, then a deal is going to necessarily be based on incomplete information.

2) Iran is continuing to support terrorist groups throughout the region, and has not even claimed it will stop that. By giving up sanctions in exchange for restrictions on their nuclear problem, we're essentially giving them a license to continue doing supporting terrorism.

3) Leaks to this point suggest that the parameters of a deal are going to permit Iran to maintain the capability to produce a nuke.

ETA:

4) The "Death to America", "Death to Israel", Israelis "aren't even human" stuff suggests that Iran really isn't interested in peaceful coexistence, period.

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

Meanwhile, more information released on the NIE used by the Bush II Administration to justify the invasion of Iraq, which, as we all know, triggered the greatest Rube Goldberg device of our times....

That article is definitely using some very selective citations from the NIE. I actually clicked on the link, downloaded the NIE itself, and here is the very opening paragraph of the NIE. It's internally formatted, and I can't get rid of the bolding, though I added the underlining.:

Key Judgments

Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of

UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as

well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it

probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.


Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq’s WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war

starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.

Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort,

energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons;

most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

In an address to an assembly of tens of thousands of Basij militiamen, Khamenei declared that Israel was doomed to fail and characterized the “Zionist regime” as the “sinister, unclean rabid dog of the region.” He also said Israelis “cannot be called human beings.” Footage of the event showed the crowd shouting “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.”

Read more: Israel 'unpleasantly surprised' by mild US reaction to Khamenei's vicious speech | The Times of Israel http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-unpleasantly-surprised-by-us-silence-on-khameneis-vicious-speech/#ixzz3VbOHnRw5
Follow us: @timesofisrael on Twitter | timesofisrael on Facebook

He also personally endorsed the "Death to America" chant as well. Unless he has since issued a clarification/retraction, I can't quite figure out why this isn't a bigger deal.